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Justice Fellowship Program, which brings a few of the finest doctoral 
candidates and senior fellows to the California Attorney General's Office to 
undertake research projects. The purpose of the program, administered by 
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justice, encourage the development of policies based on research findings, 
and enhance the use of BCS data. Through this program, we have sponsored 
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In 1922 the legal scholar later Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter declared 
that a "practical breakdown of criminal machinery" had occurred. The criminal justicT 
system had collapsed "under the weight imposed upon it by industrial urban life •••• " 
This view was the center of the progressive-era movement to reform the criminal 
justice system. The among progressive reformers was that the institutions of 
criminal justice, having continued operate in much the same way as they had in the 
19th century, suffered from extreme lack of organization. The solution was to be 
found in professionalism efficient administration. 
Sixty years later, the progressive solution had apparently been realized; criminal 
justice agencies -- police, prosecutors and courts -- had fully embraced the ideals of 
professionalism and the principles of efficient management. Yet, the system was once 
again under attack. This time critics argued that the system had become too self-
contained; that prosecutors and judges were less concerned with substantive justice and 
community interests than they were with "keeping the cases moving" in a system 
overburdened with technicalities and procedural obstacles. The practical result, 
according to this contemporary critique, was a system of justice that allowed serious 
criminals to evade the full force of the law, frequently returning them to the streets 
where they continued to contribute to ever-rising rates of crime. This critique was 
voiced not only by professionals and reformers, but was also heard in popular 
discussions -- in editorial pages and radio talk-shows. In the late 1970~s and early 
1980~s, lawmakers responded to these public demands for change with legislation aimed at 
creating a tougher justice system. 
In this study we analyze the consequences of one such attempt at reforming criminal 
justice: California~s "Victims' Bill of Rights." That law, an omnibus package of 
reform measures, represented a demand by the voters for a major shift in the orientation 
of criminal justice, away from the rehabilitation model that dominated the 1960~s and 
1970~s and toward a more punitive, retributive model. How criminal justice officials 
responded to that demand is the subject of our study. 
This focus of inquiry ultimately brings us to a broader theoretical question concerning 
the implementation of change in large, bureaucratic institutions that maintain their own 
goals and informal rules of operation. In addressing this issue we place ourselves in 
the company of numerous contemporary analysts of modern organizations who have been 
struck by a paradox: while these organizations seem to be constantly changing, they 
also seem extremely resistant to conscious efforts to introduce specific measures of 
planned change into their daily operations. This study, then, represents both an 
empirical evaluation of some of the specific consequences of the "Victims' Bill of 
Rights" and an attempt to contribute to theoretical discussions on this problem. 
Organization of the Report 
In the first two chapters we attempt to 
theoretically. The first chapter describes the 
political history and legislative precedents. 
and habitual offender provisions are discussed 
theory and previous research. 
locate the law, both historically and 
specific elements of Proposition 8, its 
In Chapter 2, the law~s plea bargaining 
within the context of organizational 
The next three chapters present empirical findings. Based primarily on field work 
conducted in courtrooms, district attorneys' and public defenders' offices, Chapter 3 
provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of Proposition 8 on plea bargaining in three 
jurisdictions: Alameda County, San Diego County, and the city of Compton, California. 
All three jurisdictions responded differently to the law, but in none of them was plea 
bargaining eliminated or its use decreased. Chapter 4 considers the impact of 
Proposition 8's habitual offender enhancements section. There, we focus on how those 
enhancements have been used in the plea bargaining process. In Chapter 5, Proposition 8 
is seen within the context of long-term changes in felony prosecution in California. 
The specific impact the law had on two trends -- a shift of plea negotiations to lower 
courts and an increase in the sentencing of offenders to prison -- is assessed in a 
time-series statistical analysis. In the final chapter the broader implications of 
these findings are discussed. There, we return to the issues of due process, 
implementation of legal change, and symbolic politics that surround controversial laws 
such as Proposition 8. 



































Proposition 8 arose from 
criminal ustice 
greatly increased the 
system practices and 
the voters --
primary election on 
no surprise to most 
attitude. Passage 
controversial gun 
voters may have 
Proposition 8. 
last two decades, 
toward crime 
, emphasizing the 
late 1970's, when 
lawmakers attempted 
However, their efforts 
Committee on Criminal 
they reached a vote in 
criminal laws blocked in 
to 
political atmosphere had 
liberals as well as 





public via the 
year. Following 
required number of 




This elect ion outcome was immediately challenged in the ifornia Snpreme Court. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the initiative violated a California law requiring that all 
initiatives refer only to a "single subject." ion 8 covered diverse 
topics -- although all were in some way related to criminal its critics 
maintained that it violated this standard and should In a decision 
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law. 
Elements of Proposition 8 
Proposition 8 changed California law in two 
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unlimited use of prior convictions 
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it significantly 
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process for defendants with previous 
the dynamics of prosecution in 
Furthermore, Proposition 8 also that habitual offender enhancements 
would actually be imposed after were court; this would requi~e placing 
a limitation udicial discretion. aspect of the Determinate Sentencing Law 
"habitual enhancements that angered the backers of Proposition 8 was that 
the imposition of these enhancements was mandatory. Judges retained the 
discretion to strike or dismiss them after they had been proven. This judicial 
power, for a similar set of enhancements, became the center of controvef~Y in a case 
decided by the California 1978. In the court 
ruled that superior court "mandatory" 
prison enhancements for persons state's "use-a-gun-go-to-prison" 
law. This decision infuriated advocates and even led to a campaign 
to recall several Supreme the Supreme Court later reheard 
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section in Proposition 8 
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long battle between 
habitual offender sections of 
available to criminal justice 
practical measures the underlying 
officials were to carry out the will of 
punishments on convicted felons. 
procedural guidelines under which 
Yet, it would be 8 as a straightforward 
directive to Many its provisions are 
exceptionally range of interpretation in fact, this 
vagueness has spurred initiative from a variety of justice 
professionals. Moreover, several statute's provisions overlap and inevitably 
result in contradictions in everyday For example, this study will show 
that although the new habitual enhancements are sometimes used to secure 
tougher sentences in apparent compliance with the intent of the law, this result is 
usually accomplished through plea bargaining, an apparent violation of other 
provisions of Proposition 8. Thus, in certain cases the "spirit'' of the law may be 
realized only if the "letter" of the is violated. 
Therefore, we should be careful when we speak of the "success" or "failure" of 
Proposition 8 in achieving change. Evaluations of similar attempts to change 
prosecution practices in other states have shown that such efforts often produce 
unanticipated consequences which may or may not be consistent with the ostensible 
goals of the reform measures. we may observe real change, but it may 
have been caused by new something else. 5 
6 
It is important to understand these dynamics before plunging into legal reform or before 
evaluating it. In the next chapter, we discuss the goals of evaluation research, 
theories of organizational change, and reports from several jurisdictions on the 
character of plea bargaining and the opportunities for its transformation. Afterwards, 
we apply these ideas in an evaluation of the effects of Proposition 8 on limiting plea 
bargaining and enhancing sentences for convicted felony offenders. 
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"five years" means exactly that. Regarding the victim's right to speak at the 
sentencing hearing and receiving restitution money from the criminal, the Supreme Court 
has tacitly approved both provisions of Proposition 8 by allowing favorable lower court 
op1n1ons to stand. See 150 Cal. App. 3d 324 (1983) and People v. 
Sweeney, 150 Cal. App. 
The Court approved the controversial "truth in evidence" provision in principle, but has 
generally applied it that its effect has been to cut back California case law when it 
exceeded the protections offered by federal case law, so that the more stringent 
California standards would coincide with federal standards. "Independent state grounds" 
for the rule excluding evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure, for 
example, were abolished in 37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985); modified footnote 19: 
38 Cal. 3d 412a. The rule standard now prevails. The federal rule 
also now applies to whether confession was voluntary and therefore admissible 
evidence. Previously, it had to be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt," but in In re 
Randy H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 316 (1984) a lower court said Proposition 8 requires that 
voluntariness be proven only by of evidence," a standard as yet 
untouched by the California Supreme Court. Similarly, the Court upheld Proposition 8 
regarding use of prior convictions as evidence against a suspect in another crime, and 
applied the federal court's rule that all prior adult felony convictions showing "moral 
turpitude" may be used against the defendant. (The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on 
this issue.) See Cal. 3d 301 (1985). Since the Castro case 
involved a standard did not apply. Similarly, in Ramona R. 
v. Superior Court, (1985), the Supreme Court refused to apply Propositi~ 
8 to permit a juvenile's statements from a pretrial hearing to be used at trial. These 
cases involving juveniles are the few that do not fall under Proposition 8, according to 
the Court. 
The prohibition of superior court plea bargaining instituted in Penal Code Section 
1192.7 has not been directly challenged. fact, it has been ignored by both 
defendants and state prosecutors in cases where such challenge was possible. For 
example, involved a plea bargain and whether Penal Code 
Section could be imposed under its terms. Neither side 
in the litigation challenging this part of Proposition 8 mentioned that under another 
section of the law it was probably illegal to negotiate the later-disputed plea 
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As used in this section "serious felony" means any of the following: 
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(1) murder or voluntary manslaughter; 3) rape; (4) 
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threat of great bodily under the 
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in the state prison for life in which the 
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Sacramento, Ca., 1982), Chapter 9, 
The Free Press, 1981). 
Chapter 2 
LEGAL IMPACT, ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND PLEA 
BARGAINING 
Considering all the effort involved in proposing and 
reasonably form the impression that laws are serious 
carefully aimed toward particular goals; when 
enacting new legislation, citizens 
things. When drafted, they must be 
operative, they must influence the 
behavior of the people whom they are addressed, 
It is frustrating and saddening, then, when social scientists announce that "nothing 
works" -- or even that a not only has failed to cause desired changes but, in fact, 
has made matters worse. Though a durable ion of commentary on legislative 
implementation takes this despairing tone, although some laws' impacts are 
occasionally described as completely disastrous, often the problem lies not with the 
laws but with the focus of their evaluations. 
Legislative Intent and Evaluation Research 
Whether a law has "worked" -- in a simplistic sense, whether it has had the etfect-
inrended by its supporters is usually difficult to assess. Legislative intent may be 
obscure or conflicting, so it is difficult to determine the drafters? or voters' intent; 
to match observed outcomes to the intent; and thus to assess whether the law produced 
acceptable results. 
Furthermore, declarations of legislative intent and impact evaluations based on them 
invite political posturing. Supporters of a particular law often make inflated claims 
of what it will accomplish, so evaluators are bound to say the innovation "failed" if 
success is measured by whether the legislation completely met its glowing goals. 
In short, legislative intent usually diffuse. The "intent" of a law may be to 
achieve what its drafters said they wanted, or it may be to achieve what its teKt 
demands, or it may be to serve deeper, murkier, but equally important psychological 
needs of the populace. Criminal ustice policies, in particular, are susceptible to 
"symbolic politics" in which "the rewards offered to constituents involve not 




attended to, problems are being solved, help is on the 
under Proposition 8 proceeds today much as it 
should not necessarily conclude that the law 
poll , problems of implementation may be 
law successfully encouraged a public 
equally important, that it sent to 
they should "get tougher." 
In this study, however, we plumb the symbolic needs served by Proposition 8, nor 
will we speculate on the multifaceted intent of its drafters. Instead, we hope simply 
to describe what actually happened in California's criminal courts. A law has had an 
impact apart from question of whether that impact matched the law's "intent" --
if it causes or encourages small but significant changes in the behavior of its target 
population. Rather set out to assess whether a law was successful or not, 
evaluators can first ask a question that is more important to the men and women whose 
daily lives the legislation touches: how has our world changed? 
That is hope to describe impact Proposition 8's plea bargaining 
limitations and sentence enhancements on the behavior of courthouse actors, We draw on 
two intellectual traditions: organizational theory and sociolegal literature on plea 
bargaining. From the first, we take approach that purposeful organizational change 
is possible but attempts must overcome the organizational inertia that inevitably 
affects bureaucracies. In other words, "some things work, to some extent." As an 
illustration, court functioning did indeed change after Proposition 8. However, these 
changes may may not be attributed primarily to the influence of Proposition 8. 
Furthermore, the changes were different depending on the characteristics of local 
courthouse workgroups. 
From the literature about plea bargaining, we conclude that California plea bargaining, 
while cooperative on the surface, is powered by adversarial dynamics and is susceptible 
to longterm "racheting" -- that is, gradual, incremental change in courthouse actors' 
shared conceptions of justice. 
9 
10 
We conclude from empirical findings that plea bargaining and sentencing have 
notions of appropriate punishments are changing. indeed changed, and that, 
But whether these changes 
legal and political factors 
of social scientific 
to determine the specific 






solely Proposition 8 or by a tangle of other 
a difficult empirical question that tests the limits 
Therefore, one of the major goals of this study is 
contribution Proposition 8 made to any observed changes. 
These tests and their 
and professional studies on 
analyze effects of 
To understand a change law, it is first necessary to appreciate the 
characteristics of the organization that the law is designed to change. Proposition 
8 is aimed at criminal courts, which are decentralized, semi-autonomous groupings of 
legal professionals serving political jurisdictions. 
Courts administer laws and are directed do so in particular ways. H. Hart has 
underscored a distinction "primary rules" "secondary rules. The former 
are rules of recognition: laws such as the substantive criminal law, prohibiting or 
requiring certain behavior and addressed to all citizens. Secondary (procedural) 
rules, however, are addressed government officials and usually are "rules about 
rules"; they prohibit or require authorities to administer the laws in certain ways, 
The functions of procedural rules are to smooth the complex process of decision-
making, to limit the discretion available to organization~! actors in it, and to make 
the process accountable the and to the public. Rules controlling plea 
bargaining or measuring criminal sentences are apt examples. 
Since they concern always work bureaucracies, these procedural 
rules must be enforced to organizational structure and dynamics. 
Organizations differ to which they will accept certain change 
strategies, and their change is often associated with their particular 
organizational structures, Courts are not on the Weberian bureaucratic 
model of most modern corporations and public agencies, In the courtroom, there is 
no "boss" nor are each assigned to particular specialized 
tasks (although each such as udge district attorney, usually 
employs a support lines). Courts are decentralized, 
loosely-knit groupings professtonals, and, unlike highly stratified private 
corporations or public court personnel are in constant communication, 
involved in mutual interaction many opportunities to influence each other. To a 
large extent, court , proving, explaining --judging -- and change is 
accomplished not by for communicating and enforcing what 
leaders want, but by reasons for a policy outcome than were offered 





run. When legislation 
truthfully say 
give-and-take of adj 
the judge controls 
is 
police, probation 
assured simply by announcing a new 
pressuring line personnel to follow it. 
laws are comparatively insulated from 
against themselves, at least in the short 
procedure, court workers cannot 
has been analyzed and tested by the 
inquisitorial court system, where 
like the boss of a hierarchically-
adversarial, Each new rule 
of prosecutors, defenders, 
organization, including courts, when 
to change, anyway. If prosecutors or 
"agendas" by shifting plea bargaining into 
order that they do so will probably meet little 
the changes mandated by Proposition 8 already 
to observe 
was passed. We 
lrl sum, when new legislation requires court personnel to alter their accepted work 
patterns, change will not occur immediately. A complex interplay of organizational 
forces will ensue, and no particular outcome can confidently be predicted. Whether and 
to what extent change occurs will be influenced by such organizational variables as: 
the varying strength of diverse courthouse professionals and patterns of rule 
communi cat ion among them; how radically the new rule departs from past accepted 
practice; and the of interest groups in urging the court to follow lhe 
new law. 
This focuses on factors and the influence they have had on 
the implementation of Proposition 8 in three CaLifornia counties. We show that, 
followi!1g Proposi~ion 8, plea bargaining shifted from superior courts to municipal 
courts where such a change had already been contemplated, but it stayed in superio~ 
court whe!1 there was no organizational ceason to change, What this mea11t for 
the character of plea bargainir1g and sente11cing outcomes depended on the particulac work 
pattecns and legal atti~udes common to courthouse professionals irl each county. 
Plea and 
Several writers have noted the uni~ue interplay of roles, tasks, and goals 
characterizing American criiUinal courts. The work world of judges, crimina~J lawyers, 
and related personnel been described both as an "assembly line" for cases and as "a 
truth-testing machine, The truth-tester metaphor is drawn from the traditional model 
of courts as adversarial arenas where facts are sorted out, vigorously challee1ged, and 
mustered into the closest approximation of truth that a human ir<stitution is likely to 
produce. 
In the 1960's, several studies challenged this ancient ideal by applying social science 
observational techniques to criminal court work. They concluded that the adversarial 
justice was a myth -- in crimi!1al courts, at least, administrative necessity 
the commentators 
usually admired 
personal interaction of court professionals produced an "ethic of 
The most obvious empirical indicator of such agreeable accommodation, 
noted, was that very few cases ever reached the procedural stage 




cases disposed in California superior courts are resolved 
end in guilty pleas, these scholars set out to 
in plea negotiations, 




"assembly line justice." 
from a angle, 
standards, they 
ln !966, 
reviewed plea bargaining 
social scientists began to haunt 
bargaining as essentially coercive 
Later, in the 1970's, critics 
claimi!1g that it produced sentences 
A major thesis plea bargaining literature is plea negotiation is accomplished by 
process as routi!1e. Routinizing 
every case would be carefully 
s personal characteristics would 
of what in theory should be a 
claim that plea bargaining is 






is more to 
wrangli!1g would. 
It is interesting 
California courts and 
material describing 
jurisdictiorls, so examining plea 
tr.aditio!1. Most of the 
organizatio!1al dynamics and 
accepted courthouse norms are 
ousting, claiming that a plea 
prosecutors, and judges "strain for 
case facts in a forthright manner 
for individual defendae1ts than adversar:ial 
sociolegal studies from across the nation, 
been most often observed. We have a lode of 
guilty plea practices in several California 
bargaining under Proposi~ion 8 will mine an established 




Some California studies describe the observed cooperation in plea bargaining not as 
semi-conspiratorial m11tual hackscratching, but as the outgrowth of a perception of 
social reality that all court professionals learn to share. That shared world view 
encourap;es court 1vorkers to handle cri'f~nal cases by "a cognitive ordering and 
classification of objects into categories." Attorneys and judges, confronted daily 
with court calendars filled with similar types of offenses and offenders, quickly 
perform organizational triage. They mentally separate the cases into categories 
based on the treatment a particular type of case usually receives, much as doctors in 
a hospital emergency room urgent cases from the. more minor ones. 
These categories are formed the particular history the court and community. 
What crime has a person who threatens a woman with a knife, committed? Will it he 
different if her purse is taken? If she is <'lderly? Most professionals in one 
particular courthouse will that the first facts would be treated as an 
attempted assault, while others would charge an attempted robbery but easily drop the 
conviction charge to assaul no other facts are produced, The second incident 
would he a robbery with a sentencing Pnhancement for "use of a deadly weapon." 
Depending on how vicious the defendant appeared, another enhancement for "elderly 
victim" would be added; the enhancements, moreover, would be added or dropped 
depending on the discussions lawyers and/or the judge about the provable 
facts of the case. tn other would be the subject of plea bargaining. 
These ncategories" case comprise them, grow the shared experience 
The punishments considered appropriate for each 
this categorization process. Overall, the 
of the courthouse professionals. 
offense type are also products 
experience that shapes this 
arguments, and patterns 
communicative organizat 
"social construct" is "courtwork": the discussions, 
interaction established in the non-hierarchical, 





legal rules have 
contested plea 
into one particular 
different one, for 
crimes and punishments 
In our study, though 
"socially constructed" 
that plea bargaining 
negotiation process. 
making in plea 
opportunities 
evaluation of Propos 
most convincingly with 
lf the law changes, 
the "socially 
criminal , and 
five-year sentencing 
calcnlns. 
Controlling Discretion Plea 
the criminal court. The raw material of these 
the cases and the law, If the law changes, will 
of offenses appropriate punishments change, 
on the definition relevant criminal 
have concluded that 
Some believe that any 
whether a certain case fits 
whether properly fits into a 
But the underlyin8 tax:onomy of 
of ning <1s ,q 
correct, we disagree with its corollaries 
and lep;al rules are irrelevant to the 
interplay of court professionals" decision-
it incorporates important 
opponents. Moreover -- and here an 
useful -- these chaLlenges are made 
sessions will too. Slowly, 
court workers measure crimes, 
if the law interjects new ideas (such as 
convictions) into the plea bargaining 
To say that Proposition R h!ls h;od an effect, however, is not to say thiit it has 
limited plea negotiations or imposition of habitual offender sentencinR 
enhancemPntq .~andatory. Indeed, if recent evRluatinns of criminal justice reform 
measures have proven anything, they have proved that it is almost impossible to 
sharply limit the discretion available legal actors. Rathe than eliminating plea 
barg11ining, these measures of simply encourage a shift of discretionary practices 
to different points in the justice system. Analogizing the system to a series of 
pipes moving water (or from point to another, with numerous outlets alo?M 
the way, researchers have referred to this tendency as "hydraulic discretion." 
Closing the valves at one point in the system -- forbidding plea bargaining in 
superior court, for example-- builds pressure so that discretion in processing cases 
will simply reappear elsewhere, at other criminal justice decision-making points. 
Numerous evaluations of legal "reform" measures have illustrated this tendency. In 1977 
the Michigan legislature passed a "Gun Law" which imposed a mandatory two-year sentence 
enhancement on anyone who used a firearm in the commission of a felony. Plea bargaining 
was also banned in such cases. A recent evaluation of the law's impact found that 
prosecutors were not, as anticipated, simply using the new enhancements as "bargaining 
tools," but were following the law by alleging and proving the gun-use enhancements in 
the majority of cases, whenever possible, Yet, average sentence lengths for cases in 
which prison terms were imposed had not increased substantially. The reason was that 
judges simply adjusted base sentences so that including a two-year enhancement did not 
alter the "going rate," i.e., the sentence the defendant would have received without the 
enhancement. Thus, the court maintained its equilibrium in the face of outside 
intervention by increasing judicial involvement in sentence bargaining. (This occurred, 
of course, when a "void" in bargaining had apr9ared. Before, the prosecutor had 
controlled negotiations through charge bargaining.) 
Evaluations of the impact of
2
8olicies to ban plea bargaining in other jurisdictions have 
produced similar findings. In a study of a plea bargaining ban adopted by the 
prosecutor's office in a Midwestern community, Churc2
1 
found that the response of 
officials was merely to change the form of bargaining. As in Michigan, the ban only 
covered "charge bargaining," in which guilty pleas are exchanged for a reduction in 
crimes charged. With this option forbidden, bargaining shifted to negotiations over 
sentences. Perhaps anticipating this, the drafters of Proposition 8 were careful to 
forbid both charge bargaining and sentence bargaining in superior court. 
One of the few evaluations of a plea bargaining ban that found such a policy to be 
relatively successful was conducted in Alaska. In 1975 the Attorney General imposed a 
statewide prohibition on plea bargaining on all district attorneys. In Alaska district 
attorneys are accountable to the Attorney General. A later evaluation of the policy 
(which was cited by Proposition 8 advocates) concluded that "the institution of plea 
bargaining was effectively curtailed in Alaska, and it had not been replaced by implicit 
or covert forms of the same practice." Furthermore, "court processes did not bog down; 
t~22 accelerated. .defendants continued to plead guilty at about the same rates. 
However, these findings must be viewed skeptically. The evaluation suffered from 
serious methodological shortcomings that may have altered the empirical basis for the 
conclusions. Furthermore, even if the policy was successful, Alaska is sufficiently 
atypical (compared to other states) that reformers should be cautious in predicting 
similar results elsewhere. The chief difference is the size of caseloads. The number 
of felony "cases" prosecuted over a two-year: period in Alaska's three largest cities 
(where the majority of people in that scantily-populated state live) totaled 2~nly 3,188 
-- equivalent to the caseloads of some of the smaller counties in California. 
Furthermore, Alaska's state budget is ample enough -- the state has no sales tax, for 
instance, since oil revenues provide most public needs -- that every defendant could 
conceivably receive a full trial without straining court resources. In fact, under the 
Alaskan experiment, the trial rate rose from about 10 percent to 20 percent , which 
certainly meant that not every defendant had demanded a trial after plea bargaining was 
eliminated, as doomsayers had predicted they would. On the other hand, the 10 percent 
increase represented a doubled trial rate. Other states could accommodate such a leap 
in trials only with difficulty. 
Previous research has also found that plea bargaining is influenced by the presence of 
sentencing "enhancements" that increase the severity of sentences because of 
characteristics of the offense or the offender. In their study of determinate 
sentencing in California, for example, Casper, et al., found that probation eligibility 
and enhancements for prior felony
2
4onvictions and use of a gun "have quickly become part 
of the plea-negotiation process." In the three California counties studied, it was 
found that "in 1978-79, the most frz~uently alleged enhancements were typically dropped 
in a third to half the cases. • ." Similar findings were reported in an unpublished 
study by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics on the use of the enhancements 
mandated by California's controversial "use-a-gun-go-to-prison" law. That study found 
that while 85 percent of the defendants eligible for the enhancement had it used against 
them, only 60 percent of those charged had the additional sentence imposed. Of the 
other 40 percent, the en2~ncements for the great majority (83 percent) were dropped as 
part of plea negotiations. 
13 
14 
In summary, the literature on plea bargaining bans and offense or offender-specific 
enhancements do not inspire much confidence in predicting that such changes will be 
mechanically implemented once mandated by law. Rather, it is more likely that their 
effects will be filtered through the organizational screens of the principal local 
criminal justice agencies. While the members of these organizations do not operate 
outside the law, the discretion they must, of necessity, be granted allows them to be 
selective in implementing new laws as they see fit. 
Yet, we hypothesize, it would be possible to change plea bargaining and sentencing if 
the changes demanded are not too radical. Since courts are decentralized 
organizations, as we have discussed, discretion and bargaining power must be 
distributed among several court professionals. As a group they can be encouraged to 
slowly change their thinking to alter their perceptions of appropriate 
categorization of criminal acts, actors, and punishments -- but these changes do not 
inevitably follow legislation. Brereton and Casper have described this process as 
"racheting": laws have impact, but it is long-term and incremental. The incremental 
character of change requires evaluators to change their scope, to view the impact of 
specific laws over periods of time, and to look for changes in unintended and 
unanticipated places. 
It was with these facts in 
the effects of Proposition 
what and how could only be 
the law was applied. 
chapter. 
mind that we approached the local jurisdictions to study 
8. We suspected that some change may have occurred, but 
discovered by looking at the day-to-day contexts in which 
These changes and their contexts are described in the next 
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Did it cause plea bargaining to 
the actual terms of the law, 
or in superior court 
has continued unabated in 
through pleas of guilty now as 
been a surge in trials or clogged 
This is not to say, however, the plea bargaining process is unchanged. As would be 
expected from knowledge of organizational dynamics, courthouse worker-s are slowly 
transforming their plea negotiation practices. While the number of guilty pleas has not 
changed, the substance of plea bargaining may have. Such incremental reforms are likely 
to be different depending organizational, social, and legal factors present in 
varying degrees in different county criminal justice systems. These changes can be 
observed daily court activities, in what plea bargaining participants tell us about 
it, and in quantitative data on trial rates, guilty plea "locations," and sentencing 
outcomes drawn both from local jurisdictions statistical reports and from state data 
bases. 
This chapter portrays how three different counties implemented the Proposition 8 plea 
bargaining limitation. It begins with a description of the common legal framework 
mandated by state law, through which every California felony case is adjudicated. 
Within these "common procedural events," criminal justice professionals make 
discretionary decisions in handling cases. Statewide data show the frequency of events 
such as trials and guilty pleas, both before Proposition 8 and after it. One major 
finding is that, although the proportion of offenders pleading guilty has not changed, 
there has been a shift in the "location" of a great number of guilty pleas from superior 
to municipal court. Another major finding that some counties embraced this shift, 
while others did not. Plea bargaining practices in three populous counties serve as 
examples of this variation, and the factors that encouraged some counties to shift cases 




of this study are Alameda County, San Diego County, and part of Los Angeles 
district, These jurisdictions are similar in that they encompass 




they have traditionally relied upon extensive plea negotiations in order to 
this caseload. They thus represent ideal sites for studying the effects of 
to limit plea bargaining. 
Yet these counties are quite different in the political and social characteristics of 
their residents, in their criminal justice practices and, specifically, in their 
responses to Proposition 8. Although courthouse workers in each jurisdiction 
conscientiously considered how to address Proposition 8, they applied its restrictions 
differently depending on the opportunities and pressures for change evident within their 
own political jurisdictions and courthouse organizations. 
Despite these differences, all three jurisdictions are in California and thus operate 
under the state Penal Code, so they necessarily share certain procedures and legal 
requirements. Procedures and laws that are common to all California felony prosecutions 
define the framework within which legal professionals operate; plea bargaining practices 
will vary among different counties only within this general, shared structure. 
Common Procedural Events 
Statutory mandates and administrative necessity have combined to produce a common 
sequence of procedural "events" in California courts that utilize the dual municipal 
court/superior court system, What follows is a functional, rather than a statutory, 
description of felony procedure. prosecutorial events may have different 
names or legai definitions, but a very general overview describes these stages by 
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This is the organizational and legal structure to which Proposition 8's plea bargaining 
restrictions were to be applied. Procedural events common to all California courts 
represent both the standards that local officials must meet in the prosecution process 
and the material available to them as they strain to accommodate any new procedural or 
substantive requirement. To some degree, this system is flexible; there are a number of 
distinct points in the process where crucial decisions are made. Guilty pleas and the 
discussions that encourage them could be shifted to some other "event" if discretion 
becomes too restricted at one particular decision point. The mercurial character of 
discretion thus allows for the widely varied responses, within the legal prescriptions 
described, that Proposition 8 evoked in individual jurisdictions. 
In the followiag sections, this variation is explored in detail in three California 
jurisdictions. In each, local criminal justice officials responded to the challenges 
posed by Proposition 8 by using one or more of the "loopholes" written into the 
statute. While professionals in each California county developed their own unique 
strategies for addressing the situation created by the new law, the three responses 
described here probably represent the principal methods of implementing the plea 
bargaining limitation statewide. Taken together, these local responses constitute the 
statewide trends in trials and guilty plea procedures that evolved after Proposition 8 
was passed. 
Effect on Trial Rates Statewide 
Prior to its passage, Proposition 8's critics had claimed that a ban on plea bargaining 
would result in a tremendous surge in trials, thus seriously clogging criminal courts. 
An outright ban on plea negotiations could quite possibly produce this outcome, since 
the judge would not be allowed to impose particular sentences in response to guilty 
pleas, and since defendants would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by having 
their cases heard by juries. 
Therefore, the first question to ask is: has the "trial rate," i.e., the proportion of 
felony cases concluded through trials, increased since Proposition 8 took effect tn June 
1982? The data in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-l show this "trial rate" for the last ten 
years, covering all California felony cases adjudicated in superior courts, for fiscal 
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trials over the past ten years, 
The data show that, even 
guilty, and presumably they 
question, then, is: though low 
California continues unabated 























The preceding overview California criminal that there are two 
types of felony guilty plea cases: cases "certified" from municipal court, and cases 
"held to answer" in superior court and later concluded through guilty plea there. A 
powerful indicator of whether Proposition 8 had an effect on California plea 
bargaining would be a comparison over time between of felony cases 
terminated through municipal court to those that are 
"held to answer" in superior court. If lo>Ier court dispositions increase, one reason 
may have been the passage of Proposition 8. Data collected from all California 
counties show that there has indeed been an increase in the use of guilty pleas 
"certified" in municipal court. 
We used Bureau of Criminal Statistics statewide data felony dispositions 
(Offender-Based Transaction Statistics -- OBTS) to track adjudication trends before 
and after Proposition 8. Felony dispositions from all California counties were 
categorized by whether the most serious offense charged at arrest was one of the 
twenty-five "serious felonies" which are subject to Proposition 8's plea bargaining 
restrictions, or whether not subject to restrictions. If 
Proposition 8 had no effec.t, both kinds of cases in 
essentially the same way. But outcomes of serious 
felony charges would show a different pattern. 
Most important, the data can reveal where felony defendants pled guilty. OBTS 
calculates the percentage of superior court~spositions that are achieved through 
municipal court-generated certified guilty pleas or through superior court proceedings. 
(Recall that certified pleas, although entered in lower courts, technically are 
sentenced in superior courts.) Table 3-2 and Figure 3-2 present statewide data on how 
"serious felony" and "other felony" cases were concluded. It shows the proportion of 
dispositions achigved through certified pleas versus the proportion of cases prosecuted 
in superior court, for six-month periods from 1980 through 1984. 
table 3-2 
CERTIFIED GUILTY PLEAS AS A PROPORTION OF 
SUPERIOR COURT DISPOSITIONS, 1980-1984 





January-June ........ 12.8 
July-December ....... 13.4 
1981 
January-June ........ 14.6 
July-December ....... 15.0 
1982 
January-June ........ 18.8 
July-December ....... 23.4 
1983 
January-June ........ 26.4 
July-December ....... 27.8 
1984 
January-June ....... 30.3 
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Statewide, the percentage of certified guilty pleas increased substantially after 
Proposition 8 was passed in June 1982, which suggests that Proposition 8 may indeed 
have had the effect of shifting felony plea negotiations to lower courts. 
However, several qualifications must be added to this interpretation. First, the use 
of certified pleas was already increasing prior to passage of Proposition 8, although 
the increase post-Proposition 8 period. Second, not only 
was there an pleas in "serious felony" cases but in 
"other" Proposition 8~s plea bargaining restrictions 
apply only to have no effect on "non-serious 
felonies." These data Proposition 8 may have only amplified a 
general trend towards felony cases in municipal court, a trend 
which began prior to 
In Chapter 5, statistical 
felony certifications from 
factors. Regardless of the 
court to municipal 
achieved by the California 
A Closer look: Trends 
Statewide, then, 
from superior 
aggregate of all 
agencies throughout 
California felony adj 
Proposition 8 
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the question of whether the increase in 
caused by Proposition 8 or by other 
in felony plea bargaining from superior 
implications the quality of justice 
Counties 
shift in the "location" of plea bargaining, 
Statewide data in the OBTS system represent an 
state data banks by criminal justice 
yields a general, overall picture of 
show the extent to which individual 
resisted it. To understand in more detail 
among local jurisdictions must be 
officials with 
court, as the 
difficult decision: 
text of the law 
crucial If plea bargaining 
if municipal court 
it be accomplished legally? 
bargaining in serious felony cases, the 
arraignment and trial often becomes murky. 
that stage, or least no concessions 
Thus, judges, prosecutors, and defense 
proper functions would be in any 
counties have superior court "pretrial conferences" or 
what transpires at this procedural stage 
Every has municipal court and superior court for an 
early criminal case through a guilty plea. 
However, because "pretrial conference" under Proposition 8 
operates under doubtful ambiguous legality, we would expect court workers 
to cast about for a procedural stage in which to engage in felony 
negotiation. Over the past most populous counties have slowly been shifting 
felony plea bargaining court. Thus, the municipal court "pre-
preliminary exam" (or or whatever other name this legally undefined 
stage may acquire in different ) has become increasingly critical to the 
smooth functioning felony prosecution, an outcome perhaps encouraged by 
Proposition 8. Inevitably, though, some cases will proceed to superior court, and 
some counties will rely on this process more than others do. What is the character 
of superior: court bargaining Proposition 8 constraints? Reports from several 
local jurisdictions address this question. 
Here, we focus on three 
Compton district of 
monstrous caseloads. In 1983 
handled 8,061 felony 
equivalents). San Diego·s 
the 
County, San Diego County, 
These jurisdictions have large 
Municipal Court of Alameda 
the court has 33 judges (or 






filings in 1983. The Compton court proce~sed 2,266 of Los Angeles County's 
approximately 37,000 felony filings in 1983. The trial rate (proportion of felony 
cases concluded by trial, as in Table 3-1) is gen3rally the same among the counties, and 
in recent years has been fairly constant in each. 
Using OBTS data, we calculated the trends in the 
felony cases in each jurisdiction. Figure 3-3 
proportion of serious felony cases concluded 
different from the overall state norm. 
use of certified pleas for disposing of 
shows that, in each county, the 
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Alameda County showed a dramatic increase in the use of certified pleas in the post-
Proposition 8 period. By 1984, 63 percent of all felony dispositions in superior court 
were from certified pleas sent to it by municipal court. In San Diego, felony 
procedures also produce a high percentage of certified pleas: 53 percent of all felonies 
concluded in superior court in 1984 were originally resolved by municipal court pleas, 
But, in contrast to Alameda County, the use of municipal court certified pleas has been 
quite common in San Diego for several years; 32 percent were certified in San Diego as 
early as 1980, compared to the 1980 total of 21 percent in Alameda County. 
Compton procedures, on the other hand, involve very few certified pleas from municipal 
court. Until 1984, municipal court disposed of less than 10 percent of the Compton 
felony caseload. 
In summary, statewide, felony plea bargaining has been migrating from superior court to 
municipal court. In individual counties, however, three different responses are 
discernable: a sharp shift in felony dispositions from superior to municipal court, a 
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B. In Alameda County 
In Alameda County, few felony convictions achieved guilty plea in municipal 
court throughout the 1970's. A slight trend toward more lower court certifications 
was underway in the early 1980's, and increased sharply immediately after the law 
passed. Certified pleas now account for of serious felony dispositions 
in Alameda County. 
This was no fluke. 
researchers that "we 
background legal work deciding 
Reading it, it clearly bargaining on 
an] indictment or information. complaint, 
which the drafters, I'm sure, talked to 
[the initiative's drafter] about it, asked 
in a public forum at the District Attorneys Association 
he deliberately left out the municipal court complaint, 
And he said yes. Now we figured .it was going to pass the 
voters. So a couple of months before it ever passed, I 
got together with the defense and the and we 
agreed that we would be following the law and the intent 
of its drafters if we did not plea bargain in the superior 
court but would in municipal. 
Clearly, the new law was affecting the of its target population but, as 
organizational theory would predict, the legislation had impact because it not 
demand too radical a departure from existing practices. Furthermore, such theory 
would predict that professionals would change their procedures if there were 
powerful intra-organizational reasons to do so, In district 
attorneys claimed that the felony caseload had become increasingly burdensome and 
that courts were breaking down under the strain. They therefore welcomed the shift 
to municipal court because they could out" many more cases through increased 
lower court activity. 
By increasing municipal court involvement in felony cases, district attorneys could 
augment their control over felony adjudication as long as court judges did not 
become restive. When discussing criminal members of the Alameda County 
District Attorney's office inevitably dot their with phrases like 
"professional," "good management " "legal "good evidence." Deputies 
who control charging claim to be who charge a felony only if 
they h~~e enough evidence to meet the standard of "guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt." Municipal court prosecutors said that it was not in interest 
to pursue cases that would perceived their 
professional duties to be to prevent from proceeding too far. In 
short, district attorneys assumed that judges undertake 
elsewhere. (Of course, had they not, the relatively passive stance of Alameda 
County Municipal Court judges could quickly have become more active.) 
By shifting a great bulk of felony decision-making to municipal court, the Alameda 
County District Attorney was simply emphasizing and institutionalizing a latent 
tendency that had already been present, though understated, in felony prosecution 
policies there for quite some time. conscious policy decision was made to comply 
with Proposition 8 by shifting review to the lower court. However, rather 
than trusting this increased to outdated organizational structures, the 
approach tightened evidentiary review even more in the municipal court. 
This management decision involved planning for passage of the new law, reassignment 
of key personnel, and redirection support services to the lower court. Meehan 
explained: 
We discussed it and I told everybody, "Here is what 
we're going to do. I intend to shift a number of the 
inspectors (investigators) to municipal court, and I intend 
to shift also some of my most senior deputy district 
attorneys, and I'm going to put them a posture so that 
they can really review those cases. We're going to make 
every attempt to have cases trial ready at the preliminary 
examination stage." These DAs are skilled trial lawyers 
who know what to expect at all stages of felony 
prosecution. Now you have to understand that we never even 
had inspectors in Muni Court. I told them ''Go out and 
hustle the witnesses, talk the police, check all the 
evidence, and have it ready by prelim." This all has to be 
done prior to prelim if you are going to plea bargain and 
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The first thing one learns about plea bargaining when talking with members of the 
District Attorney's Office is that it does not exist in Los Angeles; their office 
has forbidden the practice. There are, however, a great many "case settlements" in 
which charge or sentence reductions are exchanged for guilty pleas. While the 
difference between "plea bargaining" and "case settlement" is largely semantic, this 
shift in terminology indicates the predominant attitude in Los Angeles (as well as, 
probably, in most jurisdictions): that plea negotiations are an essential part of 
the felony adjudication process and do not necessarily subvert the interests of 
justice. Consequently, "plea bargaining" takes place in Los Angeles at mueh the 
same rate and in much the same manner in the post-Proposition 8 period as it did 
prior to Proposition 8. 
Unlike district attorneys in other counties, the Los Angeles n.A.'s office did not 
interpret Penal Code Section 1192.7 as meaning that plea bargaining in serious 
felony cases was prohibited in superior court but was allowable in municipal 
courts. To merely shift negotiations into the municipal court was seen as a 
"violation of the spirit of the law." As a result, in Los Angeles County the 
adjudieation of felony cases has largely remained in superior court. At the same 
time, the proportion of trials conducted annually has not risen: statistics from the 
Administrative Office of the Courts show that the percentage of superior court cases 
eoncluded by trial was 9.1 in fiscal year 1980/81 and 9.4 in fiscal year 1982/83. 
Over the same perio~ 7 the proportion of guilty pleas increased somewhat from 75 
percent to R2 pereent.- Apparently, a caseload crisis generated by Proposition 8 
was avoided in Los Angeles. 
This very general deseription shows that Los Angeles County responded to the new 
limitations on plea bargaining in a very different way than did counties like 
Alameda. To better understand how plea negotiations take place after Proposition 8, 
we examined more closely one jurisdiction in the county: Compton. There we found a 
rat:1er typical urban court system in which relatively large volumes of serious 
felony cases were handled with a great deal of efficiency. While eourtroom actors 
in Compton are eertainly aware of the new laws and procedural requirements that 
regularly issue from Saeramento, their primary orientation seemed to he towards the 
policies, both formal and informal, that govern eriminal justice in Los Angeles, and 
more specifically, in the South Central District. 
28
rn Rosset and Cressey's terms, 
they work within their own "subculture of justiee." 
The eourts in Compton operate under a master calendar system in which cases entering 
superior court go first to a master calendar court where defendants are arraigned 
and dates for a trial and a "pre-trial conference" are Under this system the 
master calendar court assumes a central role, functioning somewhat like a 
switehingyard. Cases enter the yard and are then routed out to various other 
departments for trial, sentencing, motions, etc. The master calendar judge is a 
dominant figure in the prosecution process it this jurist who determines, in 
large part, whether a ease will he resolved through negotiated plea or whether it 
will continue to 
This dominance results from the faet that the master calendar judge conducts or 
oversees the "pre-trial conference," the loeus of most plea negotiations in 
Compton. At these conferences, held daily in the judge's chambers, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys attempt to hammer out a disposition that is not only agreeable to 
them but also conforms to the judge's standards. The judge actively participates in 
negotiating a disposition by indicating, either explicitly or implicitly, what the 
sentence will be if the defendant pleads guilty. The latter form of participation 
is facilitated by informal policies about expected serttences. For example, it was 
the court's policy to generally give a low-term prison sentence if a defendant pled 
guilty at the superior court pre-trial conference; if he demanded a tria~~ the 
standing offer was withdrawn and the defendant risked upper or mid-term. With 
incentives such as these, the court was able to dispose of the great majority of 
cases through negotiated guilty pleas. lf a disposition was not reached at the 
initial pre-trial conference, a second or third conference could he held, allowing 
the defendant to change his plea right up the day of the trial. 
Given the fact that plea negotiations or "case settlements," as courthouse 
workers term them-- pervade superior court, is it aecurate to say that Proposition 
B's requirements are being met in Compton? The answer is yes. The District 
Attorney's Offiee, while ruling out the lower court negotiation tactic, has made 
extensive use of P.C. ll92.7's unusually broad exceptions to the ban on plea 
negotiations. Thus, virtually every serious felony ease, in which a charge or 
sentence reduction is exchanged for a guilty plea, is seen as falling under one of 
these exeeptions cited in the law. 
35 
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The Compton Branch follows "case settlement" set forth by the 
Los Angeles District Attorney's guidelines specify that when the 
conditions for one of the three "exceptions" cited in P.C. 1192.7 are met: 
The deputy 
obtain the prior 
actually prosecuting the case must 









stricken as part of 
defendant is allowed 
prepare a written 
deputy and the 
circumstances: 
plead to a charge 
less than the maximum 
a defendant, is charged with 
punishable under Penal 
to plead to fewer than 
a special enhancement, 
for probation allegation is 
a case settlement. (4) the 
to plead to a 
that the Head Deputy must personally 
These guidelines further state that "departure from this Felony Ca'se Settlement 
Policy may be made in cases enumerated in Penal Code Section 1192.7 in two 
instances: (1) Where the admissable is legally insufficient to 
establish the defendant's guilt or unusual or extr~yrdinary 
circumstances exist which demand a departure in the interest of justice. 
The first exception apparently 
be "factually guilty" 
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from avoiding trials when the 
probability of conviction at trial. 
do so much restrict plea 
trials for reasons of 
This attitude towards 






"case settlement" is reached, a 
the reasons for the action 
to deputies in the Compton Branch 
refers to problems, 
as well as one judge 
in the area mistrusted the police 
therefore were reluctant to become 
because of the pervasive 
witnesses frequently feared 
if these factors were overcome, there were 
transportation and child care that prevented 
In the opinion of Attorney's Office, in cases where such 
problems were trial might result in a nonconviction 
disposition, charge exchange for a guilty plea were 
legitimate under the exception stated Penal Code Section 1192.7, allowing plea 
negotiations when "testimony of material witness cannot be obtained." 
With such broad exceptions superior court plea bargaining ban so readily 
available, prosecutors in have found little reason to shift negotiations 
to the lower court. But, beyond the need to skirt the restrictions created by 
Proposition 8, it seems perplexing that prosecutors, as well as judges and 
defense attorneys, did not see lower court shift as an attractive alternative 
to cumbersome superior court procedures. With county-wide caseloads certainly as 
high as in either San Diego or Alameda Counties, certified pleas would seem to 
provide an ideal mechanism for processing routine felonies about which there is 
little legal dispute. Why then has there been a reluctance in Los Angeles to 
make use of a tactic that other jurisdictions have found so convenient? 
In fact, there have been attempts to move more cases into the lower courts there. 
In 1980 a policy had been instituted in Los Angeles County that allowed defendants 
who pled guilty at or before the preliminary hearing to choose the superior court 
judge who would sentence them. The policy was clearly meant to provide an 
inducement to defendants to plead early, assuming that defense attorneys were aware 
of the judges who were most likely to give more lenient sentences, 
These "Santa Claus judges," as they are called, represent the functional equivalent 
of the certification judge in Alameda County. But there is one important 
difference. In Los Angeles, the deputy district attorney handling the case must 
agree to the defense's choice of a sentencing judge, Presumably, prosecutors will 
not agree to submit cases to a judge who will give an overly lenient sentence, but 
will instead either seek some compromise choice or refuse the arrangement 
altogether. As a result, prosecutors retain control over this tactic and, as 
defense attorneys in Compton complained, defendants often get no better "deal" by 
pleading in lower court than they would if they took their case into superior 
court. With no organizational or legal incentive to shift felony negotiations to 
municipal court, superior court remained the major forum for felony dispositions. 
In the spring of 1982, a number of judges, sensing that Proposition 8 would pass, 
sponsored a second attempt to move cases to municipal court. However, the District 
Attorney's Office thwarted the effort because, according to one senior superior 
court judge: 
The D.A.'s Office is always trying to stay very 
centralized, so the downtown office can control the 
sentences handed out in plea bargaining. Otherwise, 
they're afraid their deputies would give away the 
store. 
By keeping plea bargaining superior court, the District Attorney's Office 
intended to retain control over actions its officers in the far-flung 
district offices -- no easy task in a county the size of Los Angeles. Consequently, 
certified pleas from municipal to superior court are still relatively uncommon 
there. 
In su~3ry, with plea bargaining apparently so well-accepted in the superior 
court, and with interpretation of P.C. Section 1192.7 by the District 
Attorney's Office which does not exempt the municipal court from Proposition 8's 
plea bargaining restrictions, the pressures that influenced other counties to move 
felony adjudication to the lower courts are effectively diluted in Los Angeles. 
Rather than simply ignore Proposition 8, however, courtroom actors have achieved 
formal compliance with the law's requirements by simply declaring plea negotiations, 
that apparently violate the prohibition on plea bargaining, to be "exceptions" to 
the law and thereby legally permitted. Once such a declaration has been accepted by 
all parties, no mechanisms exist to review the appropriateness of their 
application. Thus, the practice of bargaining continues in Los Angeles 
County. Whether or not this situation violates the intentions of those who drafted 
the law will be discussed in the final chapter of this report. 
Implications 
This overview of the response to Proposition 8 by legal professionals in three counties 
confirms the observations offered in Chapter 2. That is, court organizations will 
change, but only if there are powerful sociolegal reasons to do so, and only after much 
give-and-take between many legal professionals. The outcome is not mandated from above, 
and therefore the response will vary depending on the particular character of the 
counties and their legal professionals. Furthermore, as the plea bargaining literature 
shows, the guilty plea process is an important part of California felony adjudication, 
and is so deeply-rooted in professionals' v~s~on of "normal crimes" and their 
appropriate punishments, that it is not likely to be abolished. 
Commentators on the bargaining process have often claimed that there is nothi~~ 
wrong with plea negotiation as long as sentencing outcomes are just and fair. 
Similarly, the public's outrage over plea bargaining is usually premised on a belief 
that the practice produces lenient sentences. If informed that plea bargaining remains 
despite a law forbidding it, the public's outrage would likely be assuaged if they were 
also told that sentences had gotten tougher. In Chapters 4 and 5 we will examine the 
impact of Proposition 8 on sentencing. 
37 
38 
Other critics of plea negotiation dislike the device not because of its outcome but 
becaus3
5 
it subverts legal values concerned with open challenge of evidence in 
court. These concerns, while less frequently voiced by the public, are central to 
the notions of justice that underlie our legal institutions. In Chapter 6 we will 
discuss the effects of the plea bargaining limitation on the quality of due process 
in California courts. 
Notes 
1 
These are urban jurisdictions, yet this choice does not imply that Proposition 8 
has been unimportant in less densely populated counties, Where statewide trends are 
cited, of course rural counties are included, Naturally, however, the descrtption of 
Proposition 8's effect on the superior court/municipal court interplay will apply to any 
county employing that dual system, i.e., any county with a population over 40,000. 
Thirty-four of California's fifty-eight counties have municipal courts. Their caseloads 
vary; total felony filings in Butte County Municipal Court in 1983, for instance, 
constituted 170 cases, Los Angeles, with 24 separate municipal courts, processed 
38,125 felony filings in 1983, (Source: Judicial Council of California, 1984 Annual 
Report, Table A-28, p. 219-220.) Constitutional and statutory provisions carving out 
jurisdiction of lower courts include California Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 and 
Penal Code, Section 1462. 
In those counties utilizing solely a superior court system for felony adjudication, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that court professionals implemented Proposition 8's plea 
bargaining limitation very much like Los Angeles county did -- that is, by relying on 
the exceptions to the plea bargaining ban in superior court enumerated in the new law. 
2 
Section 859 of the Penal Code states that a felony offense "over which the 
superior court has original jurisdiction" commences with a "complaint" lodged against 
the defendant at an initial "appearance before a magistrate." Magistrates include 
judges both of superior and of municipal court. (Penal Code Section 808.) There is no 
statutory provision for the municipal court "pre-preliminary" discussions, but Penal 
Code Section 859a (a) states that a defendant may plead guilty before a magistrate any 
time his counsel is present, at which time the municipal court judge "shall , 
certify the case • • to the superior court. If the defendant does not plead guilty 
within ten days, the case proceeds to a preliminary examination. (Penal Code Section 
859b.) If the municipal court judge finds from the hearing that an offense was 
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed it, he or 
she will "hold the defendant to answer" and send the case to superior court. (Penal 
Code Section 872.) 
3 
The superior court "Information" functionally mirrors municipal court's 
"Complaint." A grand jury indictment also can trigger superior court review, but the 
device has been eclipsed by informations. No cases have been instigated by grand jury 
indictment in Alameda County, for example, since 1979. In 1977, by contrast, 88 cases 
began with grand jury indictments, while 2,544 proceeded from felony informations. 75 
indictments were handed down in 1978. (Source: Alameda County District Attorney Legal 
Information system, referred to as DALITE.) 
4 
The certification process is covered by Penal Code Section 859a. A superior 
(or judges) reviews the certified cases. Each case carries an "indicated 
from the municipal court, which is usually the result of some negotiation or 
discussion of the case between counsel and sometimes between counsel and the lower court 
judge. This sentence could be overturned by a superior court judge if it was disparate 
compared to other similar cases, or if the judge believes the defendant pled guilty to a 
charge that did not describe the real wrongdoing, or for some other reason. As 
mentioned, the number of times superior court sends such a case back to municipal court 
is "infinitessimal," in the words of one interviewed municipal court judge. 
5 See Appendix I for a discussion of how "serious felonies" were counted in the 
data. 
6 
Unfortunately, OBTS data do not cleanly delineate among superior court felony 
cases that end in guilty pleas, dismissals, or trials. The Table II representation of 
"cases prosecuted in superior court" therefore certified guilty plea cases from 
municipal court, but includes cases that to trial as well as those that plead 
guilty. Since the proportion of superior court "prosecutions" includes trials, if OBTS 
were able to subtract trial cases from the prosecution category, the number of 
prosecutions that conclude with guilty pleas in superior court would appear even 
smaller. The purpose of the table is to show that the proportion of serious felony 
cases concluded by municipal court guilty pleas, as compared to those settled by 
superior court guilty pleas, has increased significantly, and that increase would appear 





Judicial Council of California, 
Note that felony "filings" 
Table A-28, p. 219-220. 
filed, Dispositions may 
certified guilty pleas on include reduction to misdemeanor 
felonies, or holding felony defendants answer in superior court. 
8 
Id. Compare trial from Table A-22, page 207. 
9 
Note, however, is a considerable body of literature that 
indicates that caseload little to do with the reasons prosecutors 
and judges seek guilty reasons that defendants plead guilty. Heumann, 
for example, has shown guilty-plea rates historically have not necessarily 
been associated with heavy caseloads. Milton Heumann, 
Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 515 Spring 1975). 
moreover, even if the local justice which their cases are being adjudicated 
has considerably more resources than neighboring jurisdictions 
with similar guilty-plea rates. Organizational and administrative pressures may 
exert some general influence plea bargaining, but the specific reasons judges and 
prosecutors accept guilty pleas probably have more to do with the weight of evidence 
in the particular case and the defendant's willingness to admit guil~. See also 
Malcolm Feeley, 
Perspective, 7 LAW 
10 
Los Angeles County accounts for approximately 40 percent of all California 
felony prosecutions annually, any attempt to describe the impact of Proposition 8 
statewide must analyze its impact in Los Angeles. Studying criminal justice 
practices in a county the size of Los Angeles, however, is a formidable task. It is 
extremely difficult to obtain a complete grasp of criminal justice processes in a 
county with a population of seven and a half million, spread over a large area in 
vastly different communities, with ten separate superior court districts. Faced with 
this problem, our strategy was tc examine a single jurisdiction within the county: 
the South Central Judicial District. Although the South Central jurisdiction is not 
typical of L.A. County whole, it has certain features which make it relevant to 
this study, primarily a high proportion of serious felony cases in its criminal court 
caseloads. And, Central's District Attorney's Office, Public 
Defender's Office, and judges are all part of larger county-wide 
organizations, and are, to some degree, uniform across the entire 
county, we can offer generalization from Compton's practices to a 














California Department Health Services, 
1982 (March 1985), Table 1-3, p. 16. 
l? Id. The F.B.I. 
ranks sixth in the nation 
18 
San Diego 
reports that Oakland 
1984, p. 18, quoting 
san- Diego business leaders toward the migrant Hispanic community that local 
demographic descriptions present ethnicity of the population in two groups: "General 
Population," including White, Black, Indians, Asians, and Other, and "Persons of 
Spanish Origin," including White, Black, Indian, and Other. Totals for the two 
groups are kept separate in the report, but in this study we have combined them for 
population totals, and included all the "Spanish Origin" category under "Hispanic." 
It is unclear how many of these are citizens of the United States. 
19 












33 The institutionalization of plea negotiations at this stage in Los Angeles 
County is reflected in a sign hangs in the entrance to one of the superior court 
departments, where pretrial conferences are frequently scheduled, in the Central 
District. The sign reads as follows: 
Case Settlement 
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tatewide data show that 
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Furthermore, the bulk 
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course of plea 
judges are somewhat 
of those proven were 
table 4-2 
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR PERSONS RECEIVED IN PRISON, 
July 1982-August 1984 
Penal Code Section 667(a) 
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In our three selected counties
10
, the picture is very similar to the one displayed in 
the statewide data. Of those offenders eligible for the habitual offender enhancement, 
relatively few (between 18 and 30 percent) are actually charged. Of Lhose offenders 
charged with the enhancement, a little over half have those charges proven in court and 
only 42 percent have those enhancements imposed. It is also striking how uniform these 
patterns are across counties. One would have expected more variation in the extent to 
which these charges are brought and the points in the system at which they drop out 
because of differing plea bargaining strategies in each locale. If nothing else, then, 
the charge is being applied consistently. 
Effects on 
Even though five-year habitual offender enhancements are infrequently charged and 
even less frequently imposed, they might still result in more severe sentences for 
serious offenders. we earlier indicated, prosecutors can use the enhancement as a 
threat in order to obtain early pleas to relatively tough sentences. Defense attorneys 
told us, often despairing that in these situations their clients often "get 
scared" and agree to lengthy sentences, even in cases where legal deficiencies might 
well result in a dismissal or acquittal, or (more likely) convictions on lesser charges 
or with lighter sentences. 
If these threats were invoked with any frequency we would suspect that the severity of 
sentences for serious offenders would have increased after Proposition 8. To determine 
if the new law has had this effect we examined our local data on the sentences for 
robbery and rape cases before and after the passage of Proposition 8. We chose to look 
at sentences for these two offenses for primarily practical rather than conceptual 
reasons; they were the only two serious felony offenses for which we had sufficently 
large numbers of cases every year in all three jurisdictions. In addition to their 
methodological adequacy decided to focus on these two offenses because, unlike many 
other serious felonies, were relatively unaffected by other statutory changes that 
might have affected sentences near the time Proposition 8 went into effect. Sentences 
for both offenses were subject to legislation passed in the late seventies that 
increased sentence r-anges and modified the enhancements applirfble to these offenses. 
The results were substantial increases in sentence lengths. However, much of these 
impacts should have been by 1980, and no other significant sentencing changes 
occurred after this time. 
47 
48 
Our sample consisted 
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the probability 
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8 since the 
probability of 
to conclude that 
rape cases. 
Although these data suggest that Proposition 8 did little to "get tough" with offenders, 
the rate of imprisonment may not be the best indicator of an increase in sentencing 
severity. It may be that most of those offenders affected by the habitual offender 
enhancement would have received prison sentences had the law not been in effect simply 
because judges and prosecutors are less likely to be lenient with repeat offenders. For 
this reason, a better indicator might be the length of the term received by those 
offenders sentenced to prison. 
Since 1977 California has operated under a system of determinate sentencing. Every 
offense has a specified range lower, middle and upper -- of prison terms that 
represent the "base terms" from which judges choose. Judges are instructed to impose 
the middle term unless factors in mitigation or aggravation warrant a lower or upper 
term. Sentence lengths may also be increased with any of a number of enhancements for 
use of a firearm, infliction of great bodily itcjury, prior convictions, etc. The upper 
end of the range of potential sentences is also extended by a system of consecutive 
sentences that, within certain limits, allows sentences to be "stacked" one upon 
another. At the same time, many offenses include probation options for offenders who 
meet certain requirements. Thus, a system that was meant to provide certainty and 
uniformity allows for a broad range of punishments and gives judges and prosecutory
3 
a 
great deal of discretion in determining the sentences given to individual offenders. 
The range of prison terms for robbery are two, three and five years; for rape, three, 
six and eight years. But both offenses are subject to numerous enhancements that can 
drive actual sentences much higher. Rape, in particular, carries several severe 
enhancements that, in recent years, have dramaticat~Y increased the sentences of those 
convicted of this offense and other sexual assaults. 
ln Table 4-4 we calculated the median sentence lengths for those offenders sentenced to 
prison as calculated in Table 4-3. Again, offenders were classified in terms of the 
most serious charge in their complaint regardless of their final conviction charges. 
Sentences were calculated on the basis of the total amount of prison time imposed for 
conviction charges, including enhancements, less suspended time. Median rather than 
mean sentence lengths were calculated in order to minimize the effects of outliers, 
















csource: PROM IS. 
MEDIAN PRISON SENTENCE LENGTH (IN YEARS) FOR 
ROBBERY AND RAPE COMPLAINTS, 1980-1984 
Alameda County, San Diego County, and Compton 
Alameda County3 San Diego Countyb Comptonc 
Number Years Number Years Number Years 
284 3.0 198 6.0 110 4.0 
268 3.0 235 5.0 115 4.0 
272 3.0 276 5.0 87 3.0 
250 3.0 218 4.0 118 3.0 
169 3.0 180 3.0 132 3.0 
38 6.0 27 6.5 14 7.5 
58 4.5 27 8.5 40 9.0 
46 6.0 30 6.0 22 6.5 
31 6.0 37 8.0 12 5.0 
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Notes 
1 
After Ohio passed one of the first habitual offender enhancements in 1884, prison 
reformer Robbie Binkerhoff reported to the National Prison Association that "in Ohio the 
law has been largely nullified by the failure of the prosecuting attorney to indict 
habitual criminals as such," (Source: Quoted in Samuel Walker, Popular Justice [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980], p. 99.) 
2 
William F. McDonald, "The 'Bitch' Threatens and Bites: A Survey of Habitual 
Offender Laws in The United States" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of Criminology, Cinncinati, Ohio, November 1984). Quoted by 
permission. 
3 
Indeed, in one jurisdiction, the head deputy public defender, apparently 
believing that we were advocates of the new law, refused to be interviewed because of 
the "damage" that Proposition 8 had inflicted on his clients. 
4 
In an interview, the head of the Career Criminal Unit stated that out of 1,563 
felony cases disposed of by the DA's office in a three month period, only 28 were 
handled by the Career Criminal Unit. 
5 
See California Penal Code Section 969 1/2. 
6 
Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Proposition 8, (Sacramento: 
Assembly Office of Publications, 1982), p. 44. 
7 
The Dept. of Corrections estimated that approximately 1,200 offenders a year 
would have the five years prescribed by the law added to their sentences, (Source: 
California Department of Corrections, Population Projections: 1985-1989 [Sacramento: 
Dept. of Corrections, 1984], p. 8.) 
8 
We were able to check our hypothesis against the San Diego data, the only local 
data in which the enhancements could be isolated. In that sample we found 209 cases in 
which PC 667(a) was charged. Of these, 162 resulted in a conviction and 146 of those, 
or 91 percent, resulted in prison sentences. Although these data may not be 
representative of the entire state they do provide support for our hypothesis that most 
convicted defendants charged with PC 667(a) receive prison sentences. Thus, the BPT 
data presented likely include the great majority of those convicted defendants charged 
with the habitual offender enhancement. Furthermore, the JURIS data show that of these 
146 cases in which the defendant was sentenced to prison only 59, or 40 percent, had the 
PC 667(a) enhancement(s) actually imposed. This proportion is very similar to the 43 
percent shown in the BPT data, The differences in absolute numbers in the two sets of 
data are attributable to the fact that the samples are different. While the JURIS data 
through December 1984, the BPT data count only 
those persons actually and only those received by August 14, 1984. 
9 
Although this rate of charging may seem low it is consistent with the finding of 
researchers in other states. In a recent study of plea bargaining in six jurisdictions 
(El Paso, TX; New Orleans, LA; Seattle, WA; Tuscon, AZ; Delaware County, PA; Norfolk, 
VA) William McDonald found that although habitual offender laws were available in each 
jurisdiction, the laws were rarely applied to eligible defendants. In only one of those 
jurisdictions, New Orleans, was the charge used with any frequency. Of a sample of 968 
defendants, in all six jurisdictions, who were eligible for the enhancement by virtue of 
prior felony convictions, only 14.6 percent were sentenced as "habitual offenders." 
(Source: William McDonald, 
[Washington, D.C.: Government 
10 
We were unable to break do~ the Board of Prison Terms data so as to isolate 




One of the more significant changes in sentencing was brought about by Senate 
13, which created special enhancements and changed the way consecutive sentences 
be applied for cases involving "violent felonies" committed after January l, 
Particularly affected were rape cases. Data presented by the Judicial Council 






dramatically after the law was implemented: from 6.65 years in the last quarter of 
1979 to 18.8 years in the 1982 calendar year. (Source: 1983 Report to the Governor 
and the Legislature [San Francisco, 1984), p 5.) By the second quarter of 1984, the 
mean sentence length for forcible rape had declined to 15.3 years. (Source: 
Judicial Council of California, "Sentencing Practices Quarterly" nos~_17 __ and 28, [San 
Francisco, 1985.) Despite these changes in sentences caused by non-Proposition 8 
factor:s there are two reasons why they should not bias our results. First, since we 
are concerned with detecting an increase in sentence lengths in the post-8 period, 
our results are not confounded by the increases in sentence length occurring in the 
pre-8 period. Secondly, we need not attempt to explain any decreases in our data, 
only _increases. 
Another factor which limits the possible impact of PC 667(a) on rape cases is that 
even before Proposition 8, offenders convicted of rape could have their sentences 
lengthened by five years for each prior sexual assault conviction suffered within ten 
years of the instant offense under the provisions of PC 667.6. For certain 
offenders, then, an enhancement equally as severe as PC 667(a) existed even before 
Proposition 8 and for them we would not expect to see an increase in sentence 
severity. However, these offenders represent only a portion of those persons 
convicted or charged with rape. Proposition 8's five-year enhancement covers a much 
broader pool of offenders: those charged with rape who have suffered previous 
convictions for any of the broad class of "serious felonies" at any point in their 
past, not within ten years. Therefore, because of the broader scope of PC 667(a), 
Proposition 8 could have a significant effect on sentences in rape cases. 
12 
One factor which might have affected robbery sentences was the addition of 
Section 213.5 to the Penal Code, effective September 22, 1982, which recognized 
residential robbery as a distinct offense, punishable by three, four, or six years in 
prison (as compared with two, three, or five years for other forms of robbery). The 
Department of Corrections anticipated that the law would add an estimated 6 months to 
the terms of approximately 305 offenders convicted of residential robbery annually. 
(Source: California Department of Corrections, Population Projections, 1985-1989 
[Sacramento: Department of Corrections, 1984], p. 8.) 
13 A much more detailed discussion of determinate sentencing in California is 
found in Casper, et al., The Implementation of the California Determinate Sentencing 
Law (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981). 
14 See note 9 supra. 
15 
Loftin, et al., "Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence", 17 LAW & 
SOCIETY REV. 300 (1983). 
Chapter 5 
A STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSITION 8 
Quantitative data presented in Chapter 3 displayed a shift in felony guilty plea 
processes from superior courts to lower courts following the passage of Proposition 8. 
Early critics of the law had expected that shift; they said that Proposition 8 would 
encourage criminal justice professionals to continue plea bargaining while conforming to 
the Literal wording of the new law, either by plea bargaining in municipal court and 
thus avoiding the superior court bargaining prohibition, or by relying on the listed 
exceptions to the ban. Observations in several counties found that these have indeed 
been the primary responses. However, the quantitative data also revealed that the 
mlgrqtion to municipal court had begun prior to June 1982, suggesting that Proposition 8 
may have only continued or amplified a pre-existing trend. 
Pinpointing a specific cause for the earlier increase in the use of certified pleas is 
difficul~, but several of the prosecutors we interviewed, including the president of the 
CaLifornia District Attorneys' Association, suggested that the trend was part of a 
general movement to make courts more efficient. Prosecutors say that municipal courts, 
at least tn felony processing, are becoming increasingly concerned with rigorous 
screening, Prosecutors diagnose felony cases as soon as the police bring them into the 
system. Two types of cases can generally be handled immediately: cases with little 
legal weight and cases with overwhelming weight. These are defendants whose legal 
problems are either minor or nonexistent, or those against whom the evidence of guilt is 
overwhelming. ln either type, the prosecutor is likely to handle the case so as to 
achieve a quick disposition, thereby saving professional resources for the trickier 
cases, where evidence is not yet well-developed and weighed, or where the gravity of the 
offense dictates very careful treatment. 
Court professionals use a medical term to describe those felony defendants whose guilt 
seems overwhelming the moment their cases enter the system. These cases are 
"deadbang," as one judge explained, "dead on arrival." A defense attorney whose client 
is "DOA" will scramble simply Lo get the best sentence possible in comparison to other 
similar cases. Prosecutors will readily agree Lo the guilty plea and a certain 
sentence, and judges will cheerily close the case. From a practical viewpoint, there 
seems little reason to do anything else. 
With "deadbang" cases and "reasonable doubt" cases (i.e., those in which the state may 
be unable to prove guilt) concluded in lower courts, superior courts are free to devote 
more their attention to the more serious and the more complex cases that require 
extensive legal scrutiny. Although conclusive evidence for this explanation is 
difficult to gather, this argument seems logically convincing and accords with available 
data showing the in,:reasing propensity of California prosecutors to reject felony 
complaint requests. This increase in the early screening of cases could be seen as part 
of the to clear the courts of cases that will only result in a dismissal or 
acquittal. Dismissnl or nolle pros rates, however, do not probe the frequency or legal 
backgr-ound of "dead bang" case ,::_onvictions. We have no statistical tests that can 
confirm what court professionals told us: that the rise in felony guilty pleas in 
municipal courts is attributable mostly to "deadbang" cases, and that Proposition 8 
simply ratified a growing propensity to dispose of these cases quickly. Furthermore, 
even if this is so, we question whether the medical metaphor should pervade the legal 
system to this extent. In the final chapter, we will criticize this development. 
In light of this our empirical question becomes: did Propostion 8 effect a 
shift in the level of certified guilty pleas in California lower courts? Looking at two 
counties where a change in those levels did occur, we arrive at two different answers: 
in Alameda County, Proposition 8 clearly evoked a dramatic increase in the use of 
certified guilty pleas; in San Diego County the law had little effect as local 
procedural changes had already moved substantial numbers of cases to early disposition 
in lower court. With such wide variations across counties, conclusions about the 
meaning of statewide patterns must be made with caution, 
The same caution must be exercised 
Proposition 8 may have had on 
jurisdictions studied, the new law 
offenders went to prison at the 
before and after the law went 
before reaching any conclusions about the effects 
sentencing, ln Chapter 4 we found that in the three 
had litcle effect on sentencing outcomes; convicted 
same rates and for nearly equal lengths of time both 
into effect. Yet, it is possible that these 
53 
54 
jurisdictions were peculiar and different results could be found when the data from 
the rest of the state are examined. Unfortunately, com~arable data on prison 
sentence lengths at the statewide level are not available. However, we can 
calculate statewide trends the probability that convicted felons will be sentenced 
to prison. With these measures can begin to answer the broad question: did the 
"Victims~ Bill of Rights" resul::: in tougher senterlces for convicted offenders in 
California? 
However, causal "before and after" comparison must be 
avoided. As our initiative and its predecessors indicated, 
following the implementation sentencing in 1977, a number of changes 
in California laws moved criminal justice in an increasingly 
punitive direction. was felt throughout the criminal 
justice system from law corrections. Also, throughout much of the 
pre-Proposition 8 period crime arrest rates were increasing and courts were 
undoubtedly forced to respond to rapid increases in criminal caseloads by 
making procedural adjustments, , prosecution practices in California 
courts were undergoing substantial change prior to passage of the '~ictims' Bill of 
Rights." Therefore, rather than see law in isolation, we feel that Proposition 
8's impacts should be other previous and contemporaneous changes 
in California criminal 
The best empirical method for this perspective is to arrange our data into 
time-series, encompassing long periods of time before and after Proposition 8 was 
implemented. Analyzed in this fashion, change is seen as cumulative and incremental, 
rather than sudden and radical and, we reduce the risk of attributing any observed 
changes to Proposition 8 that may have, in fact, been part of an earlier trend. The 
problem with this methodology is that it makes it difficult to isolate the specific 
contribution of any single influence to observed tr:ends. We will attempt to overcome 
this limitation by using statistical techniques that measure the impacts on a series 
at a certain point in time and by comparing the impacts on those cases that should 
have been affected by the law that should not. 
Interrupted Time-series 
The simplest method for determining if Proposition 8 was responsible for the increase 
in the use of certified guilty pleas is simply compare the rate of increase in 
their use before and after the law was passed. Figure 5-l presents the data on 
serious felonies disposed through certified pleas statewide, broken into two trend 
lines pre- and post-Proposition 8. These trend lines are actually simple regression 
lines in which the correlation between time (expressed in months) and the proportion 
of superior court dispositions resulting from certified pleas was plotted over the 
two time periods. For each these regression lines we were then able to obtain a 
slope which may be interpreted as representing the rate of increase in the use of 
certified pleas. Thus, Figure 5-l that although the use of certified pleas in 
"serious felony" cases was throughout the entire period, the slope in the 
post-period ( .0035) was slope in the pre-period ( .0020) suggesting 
that there was a co dispose of cases in lower court after 
Proposition 8 was passed. 
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To determine if the difference in these two slopes is statistically significant, i.e., 
if the change i~ slopes was not due to random fluctuation, we could apply standard 
statistical tests. However, statistical problems inherent to regression models limit 
the applicability of this technique to our empirical question, Like many statistical 
models, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, as we used above, assumes that all 
observations are independent, i.e., that the value of one data point is in no way 
determined by the value of another data point. However, with time-series data one must 
necessarily assume that one data point is influenced by the value of other data points, 
particularly when they occur in close temporal proximity. Thus, the observations are 
autocorrelated rather than independent. In this study, autocorrelation is evidenced by 
the fact (J;~the proportion of felony dispositions achieved through certified pleas in 
any month is greatly influenced by the proportion that occurred in the preceding months; 
that is, the use of certified pleas is not a decision that is made anew each month but 
rather is part of long term trends stemming from earlier decisions. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the data in Figure 5-l are autocorrelated. 
This autocorrelation does not affect the regression slopes but does have a biasing 
effect on any statistical tests of significance that might compare differences in the 
slopes. This means that we can not simply apply tests of significance to the two slopes 
to determine if the post-8 increase in the use of certified pleas can be attributed to 
Proposition 8. 
To overcome these limitations we utilize an ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving 
Average) model which incorporates au5ocorrelation into the model. Full discussions of 
ARIMA models can be found elsewhere and our discussion here will be brief and 
schematic. ARIMA models consist of two components: a deterministic component comprised 
of the observable factors that influence the series in a constant, systematic fashion 
and a "stochastic" component that follows laws of probability. A series can be 
generaLed by either an autoregressive model (AR), or a moving average model (MA), or a 
combination of both. In simplistic terms, we may say that in an autoregressive model 
the cu~:rent time-series observation is composed of portions of preceding observations 
and a random shock, while a moving averge model is composed of a current random shock 
and portions o.f the preceding random shocks. For both models, the driving force of the 
series is assumed to be a series of small "shocks" (the error term) that initially set 
the process in motion and continue to keep it in motion thereafter. While these random 
shocks are comprised of a vast assortment of factors that influence the dependent 
variable in a fashion which can be statistically modeled, theoretically no deterministic 
or explanatory independent variable is isolated. 
The first task in modeling a series is to determine whether the series is statiooary or 
Briefly, we can say that a series is stationary if it has a mean, 
and variance that are essentially constant over time. If a series 
trends or drifts upwards or downwards, it must be differenced (a process which 
calculates successive changes in the values of data in the series, thereby removing 
trend or drift). 
To identify an appropriate model, we consider the patterns of two crucial parameters: 
the "autocorrelation function" and the "partial autocorrelation function" for the 
differenced or stationary series. Both of these measures indicate the strength of the 
relationships among the observations at different lags, and will have a distinctive 
pattern depending on whether the series is a moving average or an autoregressive or a 
combination of both. Once an appropriate model has been tentatively identified, its 
adequacy is diagnosed by examining the autocorrelation and partial correlation of the 
residuals. If the residuals are insignificant (white noise) we assume that the model 
"fits" the data well, i.e., allows one to predict the values of observations, 
The resultant model can be used to describe the entire series, but this is not our 
objective. We want to know if the series was substantially different after a certain 
point in time, a point that may be called an ''intervention." To test this hypothesis 
we must introduce an additional variable into our model, an intervention component. The 
intervention component can be modeled as four general types of impacts. Abrupt, 
permanent impacts occur when the effect is felt immediately after the intervention and 
remains constant throughout the post-intervention portion of the series. In abrupt, 
temporar~ impacts the effect of the impact is also immediate but thereafter the 
contribution it makes decays and eventually returns to the pre-intervention level. In 
contrast, gradual, permanent impacts indicate a change in the series that occurs over a 
number of post-intervention observations and remains constant throughout the remainder 
of the series, A temporary impact rarely occurs in the social sciences and 
need not be If the residuals remain insignificant when the intervention 
component is added we can assume the intervention we have modeled is adequate. 
55 
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In an attempt to satisfy the quantitatively-inclined but not burden readers more 
interested in policy, we will present a summary of the results of the ARIMA tests 
along with a brief discussion of their implications and include a fuller discussion 
of the results of the statistical analysis in Appendix II. 
The Impact on Certified Pleas 
We began our analysis with the statewide, serious felony series. First, the series 
was regularly differenced to make it stationary. Next, the pre-intervention series 
was modeled and a first-order moving average model (0,1,1) was found to provide the 
best fit to the data, The parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics for all the 
pre-intervention series are presented in Table 5-l. 
table 5-1 
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS 
FOR THE PRE~INTERVENTION SERIES 
Statewide and Alameda and San Diego Counties 
Residual 
Parameter Standard t ~ mean ljung~ 
Series value error statistic square Box Q 
Certified guilty plea 
Statewide 
Serious felonies. &,~.49 .120 4.07 .0002 0, =24 
Other felonies . &,=.55 .115 4.79 .0002 o;:=22 
Alameda County 
Serious felonies ... e,=.73 .095 7.66 .0042 0,,=15 
Other felonies &,=.56 .109 5.12 .0050 0,,=11 
San Diego County 
Serious felonies. &,=.65 .104 6.27 .0048 0,.=20 
Other felonies .. 6,=.71 .093 7.64 .0029 o;.=21 
Prison 
Statewide 
Serious felonies. .124 3.60 .0002 0,,=22 
Other felonies .. .129 2.33 .0002 Q =19 20 
Note: at the .05 level. Also, all the Ljung"Box 0 statistics 
are insignificant at meaning that the residual autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelations are not zero. None of the autocorrelation or partial auto· 
correlation functions for residuals revealed significant spikes (with the exception of those 
listed in Appendix 1!, Note 2). 
With the pre-intervention ARIMA model tentatively specified, we then assessed the 
inclusion of an intervention component, The parameter values and diagnostic 
statistics for the full series with the intervention component are presented in Table 
5-2. Although an abrupt, temporary impact was found to be significant, the "decay" 
away from the impact and towards the pre-intervention level was so slight, we 
determined that an abrupt, permanent model would be more appropriate. Diagnostic 
assessment of that model revealed a significant impact of .0052 beginning at the 
first post-intervention observation (July 1982) and continuing throughout the post-
intervention series, In other words, the number of certifications as a proportion of 
superior court dispositions rose by .0052 each month, beyond the level that would 
have been achieved had the pre-intervention trends continued unchanged, 
Conceptualized another way, we can say that Proposition 8 caused a 3.7 percent 
increase relative to the pre-intervention mean. 
While an increase of .0052 each month is statistically significant, in practical 
terms it is quite small. It appears that Proposition 8 had much less of an effect on 
the use of certified guilty pleas than a simple visual inspection of the plotted 
series might lead one to believe, Furthermore, contrary to our expectations, the 
full impact was felt immediately after the law was passed (as indicated by the fact 
that the intervention component was best modeled as an abrupt, permanent impact). 
Given the manner in which most legislation is implemented, it would seem logical that 
any shift in local policies would have taken at least several months to reach a full 
impact, particularly in light of the fact that many prosecutors and judges at the 
time claimed to be skeptical about the law's legality and awaited the Supreme Court's 
decision on the "single subject" question before responding to the law's 
requirements. We believe, however, that observed changes in the statewide data are 
the product of events in several counties. Immediately following the law's passage, 
several jurisdictions (one of which was Alameda) instituted policies that produced 
dramatic shifts of cases to lower courts, while the majority of jurisdictions 
continued with "business as usual," i.e., tending to shift plea negotiations to lower 
courts at the same rates they had prior to the law. Therefore, the slight impact 
seen in the statewide data was likel6 produced by more dramatic changes that took 
place in several specific jurisdictions. 
As a second means for checking the specific impacts of the law on felony cases, we 
applied the same statistical techniques to the "other felony" data. Since Proposition 
8's restrictions on plea bargaining apply only to "serious felonies," presumably, 
prosecutors and other officials would have no incentive for shifting negotiations in 
these cases to lower courts. Thus, we would expect no significant impact on other, 
"non-serious" felonies. 
The best fitting ARIMA model for the "other felony" pre-intervention series was also a 
regularly differenced first-or-der moving average model. After estimating several 
intervention components, we determined that an abrupt, permanent impact was 
significant. That impact resulted in an increase of .0045 at the first and every 
succeeding post-intervention observation. The general effect was an increase at the 
point of intervention of 2.5 percent over the level of the pre-intervention mean. 
Again, the impact was significant in statistical terms only; a .0045, or less than half 
a percent, increase does not indicate a radical shift in policy. More interesting is 
the fact that the "other felonies" appear to have been affected by the law in much the 
same way as the "serious felonies." This statistical finding is easily interpreted, 
however, since in our field \.rork observations we found that prosecutors, judges and 
defense attorneys did not frequently distinguish "serious felony" cases from other 
cases. Only for the purposes of enhancement and in cases where the "serious felony" 
status was at issue was the distinction applied. Therefore, it appears that in those 
jurisdictions where a policy decision was made to shift plea negotiations to lower 
court, the policy affected all felony cases. 
table 5-2 
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS 
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTEREVENTION COMPONENT 




Parameter Standard t ~ mean Ljung~ vennon Percent 
Series va!ue error statistic square Box 0 mean increase 
Serious felonies. e,~AB ~ 10 4~73 ~0003 0 ~R9 ~ 139 3~74 
w, =~0052 ~002 3~32 20 
Other felonies . &,=~56 ~092 6~ 11 ~0002 Q =16 ~ 181 2.49 
w0=~0045 ~001 3~63 
20 
Note: Ail parameter values are s!gnif1cam at the .05 level and the ch1-squares are insignificant at the .05 level, 
As mentioned earlier, the individual jurisdictions we examined showed considerable 
variation in their responses to the law. To more precisely measure these responses we 
also applied the same interrupted time-series techniques to the data from these 
jurisdictions. The monthly proportion of "serious felony" and "other felony" superior 
court dispositions processed as certified guilty pleas between 1978 and 1984 in Alameda 
County are presented in Figure S-2. Because the samples are much smaller at the county 
level, the month-to-month fluctuations are much greater than in the st7tewide series. 




















·~~ f n:fft I I ,, .~ 


















l I 1 




I •• I I (\I'· 
,. I f: :'IV' ,. I 'I I . 




v rn ~ I ~ I I 






Modeling the "serious felony" series first, we found the best-fitting ARIMA model for 
the pre-intervention series was again a regularly differenced, first order moving 
average model (0,1,1). For statistical reasons described in Appendix II, we modeled 
the intervention component as an abrupt, temporary impact beginning one month after 
the intervention (August 1982). The parameter values and statistics for this 
intervention model are presented in Table 5-3. Using this model we forecast an 
increase of .13 in the certification rate for serious felonies in the first month 
following the intervention. The impact decreased in magnitude in the succeeding 
months so that by the sixth post-intervention month 95 percent of the impact had 
dissipated. 
Stated in more practical terms, this means that one month after the passage of 
Proposition 8 the proportion of superior court dispositions obtained through 
certified guilty pleas increased by .13 over what would have been expected, had the 
pre- intervention trends continued. This impact continued to be felt in the several 
months that followed, although with less and less force, until by the sixth month the 
certification rate leveled off at approximately .56. By the seventh month, while the 
overall level of the series was still increasing, the rate of increase in the use of 
certified pleas was very close to the rate of increase evident before June 1982. 
These statistical findings are consistent with the picture suggested by the plotted 
series in Figure 5-2. lt appears that an initial dramatic increase in the use of 
certified pleas was followed by a general stabilization in their use. The sudden 
impact immediately after the intervention had the effect of significantly raising the 
value of the post-intervention mean over the pre-intervention mean while leaving 
their slopes nearly equal. 
These findings are also consistent with the fact that in Alameda County a policy was 
implemented by the District Attorney~s Office soon after the law was passed, with the 
stated intent of moving cases to early disposition in lower courts. (Our statistical 
data show this policy has been quite successful, both in accomplishing that goal 
very rapidly and in making it last.) 
As with the statewide data, we compared the impact on "serious felonies" with the 
impact on "other felonies" in Alameda County. Once again, the pre-intervention ARIMA 
mode 1 was a first order, moving average model. The intervention component was 
modeled as a higher-order, abrupt, temporary impact and a significant impact of .098 
at the first post-intervention point was found. That impact eventually leveled off 
at the seventh post-intervention observation so that the series stabilized at .57. 
Although the initial impact was less for the "other felonies" than for the "serious 
felonies,'' the impact nonetheless represented a dramatic departure from the level of 
the pre-intervention series. Thus, can conclude that in Alameda County, 
Proposition 8 caused a sudden shift in plea negotiations to lower court for both 
"serious felony" cases and also "other felony" cases. As we mentioned earlier, in 
Alameda County once the decision was made to shift,negotiations to the lower court 
the policy was embraced by prosecutors who saw it as an efficient mechanism for 
handling all cases, not just " felony" cases. 
table 5-3 
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS 
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTERVENTION COMPONENT 
Certified Plea Rate 
Alameda 
Residual 
Parameter Standard t, mean Ljung, 
Series value error statistic square Box 0 




Other felonies &,=.68 .079 8.52 .0045 0,0~18 
w1=.098 .042 2.33 
d,~.61 .189 3.21 
Note· All parameter values are significant at the .05 !eve! and the ch1~squares are insignificant at the .05 level. 
Recall that in Chapter 3 the annual data on certified guilty pleas in San Diego County 
suggested that there was little increase in their use after the passage of Proposition 
8. 
The monthly data for "serious felony" and "othe:e felony" cases, with the pre-
intervention and post-intervention slopes calculated, displayed in Figure 5-3, would 
appear to lend further support to this conclusion. However, as we mentioned earlier, 
regression slopes can be misleading so we also modeled the San Diego certification data 





























CERTIF !EO GUILTY PLEAS AS A PROPORTION OF 
SUPERIOR COURT 1978~1984 
24 36 4B 
MONTH 
I i 
I""" PROPOSITION 8 
PASSED 
60 72 84 
--SERIOUS FELONIES 
---OTHER FELONIES 
The pre-intervention, series modeled as an ARIMA ( 0, 1, l} mode 1. 
Each of the possible intervention components was modeled and none were found to be 
significant. The same procedures were for the "other felony" series. Again, 
using an ARIMA (0,1, ) model to estimate all three intervention components, we found no 
significant impact due the intervention. based on the pattern of 
autocorrelation of the full differenced series, we identified, estimated and accepted an 
ARIMA (0,1,1) model for the full series. The paramater values and statistics for both 
San Diego series are presented in Table 5-4. 
table 5-4 
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS 
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTERVENTION COMPONENT 
Certified Plea Rate 
Residual 
Parameter Standard t· mean 
Series va!ue statistic square 
Serious felonies. 6,=.71 .077 9.30 .0048 =20 
Other felonies . 6,=.72 .073 9.96 .0032 
Note: All parameter values are sign1f1cant at the .05 and the ch1-squares 1nsign1f1Cant at the .05 level 
Thus, our conclusion that Proposition 8 did not affect the use of certified guilty pleas 




We were unable to assemble comparable data on the use of certified guilty pleas 
distinguished between "serious felony" and "other felony" cases in Compton. 
were available, from the Los Angeles Superior Courts, on certified pleas for 
felony cases. These monthy rates, from January 1980 through August 1984, 
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The data in Figure 5-4 show that although there was a significant increase in the use 
of certified pleas in the post-intervention portion of the series, this increase did 
not begin until April or May 1983. the increase at that time can be explained 
by factors unrelated to Proposicion 8, we decided that an interrupted time-series 
analysis was not necessary to determine that Proposition 8 had little effect on the 
use of certified guilty pleas in Compton. 
The Effect of Proposition 8 on Sentencing 
Our brief discussion of the campaign for the "Victims' Bill of Rights" in Chapter l 
indicated that the publicly proclaimed intent of the law was to "get tough" with 
criminals. This purpose was clearly enunciated by then Attorney General George 
Deukmejian who was quoted in the state sample ballot as saying • "There is 
absolutely no question that this proposition will result in more criminal 
convictions, more crim~nals being sentenced to prison, and more protection for the 
law-abiding citizenry." 
One measure of this expected "toughness" is the probability that felony defendants, 
once convicted, will be sentenced to prison. As discussed earlier, one mechanism 
contained in Proposition 8 that could increase this probability is the habitual 
offender law which, by greatly increasing the possible sentences faced by some 
defendants facing serious felony charges, increases the likelihood Lhat in such cases 
prosecutors will obtain guilty pleas from defendants who agree to accept prison 
sentences. In our analysis of sentencing in three jurisdictions (reported in Chapter 
4) we found that for two serious felony offenses this probability did not increase 
after June 1982. But again, the idiosyncrasies of local prosecutorial and judicial 
policies make it difficult to generalize from these three jurisdictions to the state 
as a whole. In the analysis that follows we examine statewide data to determine if 
this probability increased for a much broader sample of "serious felonies" and "other 
felonies"; or, put more precisely, whether that probability increased at a rate 
greater than one would have expected had the law not gone into effect. 
To accomplish this goal we turn to OBTS data on offenders sentenced in California 
superior courts (including defendants convicted via the certified guilty plea process) 
from 1978 through 1984. The data displayed in Figure 5-5 below represent the number of 
defendants sentenced to prison as a proportion of all superior court sentences by month 
of final disposition from January 1, 1978 through December 31, 1984. The data are 
further broken down according to whether the defendant's most serious charge at arrest 
was a Proposi~lon 8 "serio<IS felony" or an "other felony." These data, then, represent 
che propor~.ion of perowns legally eligible to be sentenced to prison who a.::Lually 
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Looking only at the post-Proposition 8 side of the trend line for "serious felonies," we 
see that the proportion of eligible persons sentenced to prison did indeed increase; 
from 40.6 in June 1982 to 47.4 percent in December 1984. However, several other 
prominent of the data immediately force us to question how much Proposition 8 
had to do with this increase. First, the trend line was already moving up prior to the 
intervention point and the post-intervention increase appears to be a continuation of 
this trend. This suggests that whatever caused judges and prosecutors to more 
frequently seek prison sentences in the pre-8 period also caused them to do so in the 
post-8 period. Secondly, not only did those convicted defendants originally charged 
with "serious felonies" show an increased likelihood to be sentenced to prison but so 
did those charged with "other felonies." This again indicates that something other 
than Proposition 8 was driving the rate upwards. 
As we did earlier, to determine the impact that Proposition 8 may have had on prison 
sentences, we applied the ARIMA interrupted time-series statistical tests to both 
series. With both pre-intervention series modeled as ARIMA (0,1,1) models, no 
significant impact was found for any of the three intervention models. We then returned 
to the full series autocorrelation pattern and estimated, identified, and diagnosed an 
ARIMA (0,1,1) model for the full series. The parameter values and statistics for both 




PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS 




Parameter Standard t- mean Ljung-
Series value error statistic square Box Q 
Serious felonies, &,~_52 ,094 5,51 ,0003 Q =9,9 20 
Other felonies _ &,=-34 ,102 3,37 ,0002 o,.=19 
Note: All parameter values are significant at the .05 ievel and the chi-squares are insignificant at the .05 level. 
In answer to our original question, we conclude that Proposition 8 did not increase 
the probability of imprisonment in "serious felony" or "other felony" cases that 
reached conviction, beyond the level that would have been attained had the law not 
been implemented. 
A Reassessment of the Trend 
Supporters of Proposition 8 might argue, however, that had it not been for the law, 
the upward trend in the use of prison sentences might have leveled off and fallen 
short of what they feel is an appropriate level of severity, In any case, they might 
state, the data show that for serious offenders the probability of being incarcerated 
for long periods of time has increased, and whether or not Proposition 8 was solely 
responsible is unimportant. What is important is that more serious offenders are 
being sent away, resulting in, as then Attorney General Deukmejian put it, "more 
protection for the law-abiding citizenry." 
Based on the data presented above, this conclusion would seem reasonable. The 
probability that serious offenders, once convicted, would be sentenced to prison did 
increase in the post-8 period. However, if one's interest is in the proportion of 
offenders "kept off the street," the data could be misleading. Prison is not the 
only state institution where adult serious offenders may be incarcerated for long 
periods of time. During much of this period, persons convicted of serious felonies 
in California could also be sentenced as youthful offenders to the California Youth 
Authority or as Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders to correctional/medical 
facilities, It is safe to that offenders receiving sentences to these 
institutions were also being kept the streets" for long periods of time. 
In 1982 two laws went into effect that eliminated these alternatives to prison for 
serious offenders and which could account for much of the increase in prison 
sentences evident in Figure 5-5. Section 8 of Proposition 8 added Section 1732.5 to 
the Welfare and Institutions Code, which reads, " ••• no person convicted of murder, 
rape or any other serious felony, as defined in Section 1192.7 of the Penal Code, 
committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older shall be committed to the Youth 
Authority." Prior to this, superior court judges had the option of sentencing 
offenders between 18 and 20 to CYA until they were 25 years old. The Department of 
Corrections estimated that this TBange in the law would result in 740 new offenders 
being sentenced to prison annually ; offenders who previously would have been 
sentenced to CYA. Although Proposition 8li requirement was reversed by later 
legislation (SB 821, effective January 1, 1984) these offenders still appear in the 
data in Figure 5-5 as having received prison sentences. 
The second, albeit less influential, change in criminal law that affected prison 
se?zences was legislation (effective January 1, 1982 and duplicated by Proposition 
8) that repealed the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender program. Under that program 
judges had the authority to interrupt criminal proceedings and order a hearing to 
determine if the defendant could be diagnosed as a Mentally Disordered Sex Offender, 
defined as, "any person, who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is 
predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is 
dangerous to the health and safety of others" (Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 
6300). If the defendant was diagnosed as such, the judge could have had him/her 
committed to a state hospital for a period not exceeding the term they would have 
served had they been commited to state prison. The abolition of the MDSO law was 
part of the effort underway in the late 1970's and early 1980's to move criminal 
justice in13california away from a rehabilitative and towards a more punitive 
philosophy. In more practical terms, the Department of Corrections estimated that 
approximately 180 additional offT~ders were sentenced to prison in fiscal year 1982-83 
as a result of this legislation. 
The effects these two statutory changes had on sentencing can be seen in Figure 5-6 in 
which CYA and MDSO sentences were calculated as a proportion of all superior court 
sentences. Those data show that the proportion of serious felony superior court 
sentences resulting in CYA/MDSO commitments declined from 7.5 percent at the beginning 
of 1978 to 1 percent at the end of 1984, with the sharpest decline occurring after 
January 1982. While these two dispositions never accounted for a large proportion of 
all superior court sentences their decline was significant enough to affect the 
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Because MDSO and CYA sentences also involve confinement in a state institution for long 
periods of time, we feel that the proportion of prison sentences alone is not the best 
measure of long-term incarceration, A better measure would combine all three sentences 
into what we will call a "state incarceration rate," This statistic allows one to 
compare sentences in which offenders are "locked away" for long periods of time (over a 
year) with such "local time" sentences as jail, probation, and probation with jail which 
require relatively short amounts or no incarceration time. With this measure we 
recalculated the data for "serious felonies," combining those defendants sentenced to 
prison with those sentenced as "youthful offenders" (between the ages of 18 and 23) to 
CYA and those sentenced as MDSO's, The results, displayed in Figure 5-7, present a 
different picture of sentencing trends. The trend line for "serious felonies" generally 
rose in the pre-8 period (with a slope of .0019) but began to level off in the beginning 
of 1982 and rose very slightly in the post-8 period (post slope = .0008). In other 
words, the data show that the likelihood that convicted serious offenders would be 
incarcerated in state institutions did increase following the passage of Proposition 
8; in fact, the probability actually decreased in relation to the pre-8 trend. A more 
pronounced version of this pattern is displayed in the "other felonies" series, where a 
steady increase in the pre-8 period (slope = .0015) is followed by a very slight decline 
(slope = .00001) in the post-8 period. An explanation for the stabilized trend in the 
post-period for both sets of data would require a rigorous analysis which we cannot 
undertake at this point. But we can conclude that it was apparently unconnected to 
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A leveling off in the "state incarceration rate" should be accompanied by a similar 
trend in the obverse measure, the "local time" rate, as it 1~ight be called, that includes jail, probation, and probation with jail sentences. In Figure 5-8 that 
rate was calculated for "serious felonies" and "other felonies" disposed of in 
superior court. Both series show a similar pattern. Following a steady decline in 
the use of these sentences throughout 1980 and 1981, suggesting that courts were 
indeed becoming more punitive, the trend remained relatively stable in the next three 
years. These data may be taken as further evidence that Proposition 8 did not 
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To summarize, in the preceding analysis we have attempted to show that simple trend data 
on prison sentences before and after Proposition 8 could mislead one into thinking that 
since the law was implemented the probability of serious offenders being "locked up" for 
long periods of time has increased. Based on our analysis of the data we argued that 
while it is certainly true that, proportionately, the number of offenders sentenced to 
prison has increased, that increase has not been caused by the imprisonment of a group 
of offenders who would have otherwise been "on the street" either following a short term 
in a county jail or by dint of a lenient probation sentence. On the contrary, almost 
all of the increase came from the "transfer" of offenders who would otherwise have been 
committed to other state institutions where, regardless of the different conditions of 
their
16
confinement, they would have also been incarcerated for considerable periods of 
time. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we attempted to view Proposition 8 in the context of other long-term and 
short-term changes in California criminal justice. Using time-series statistical 
techniques we sought to determine the specific influence the law had on plea bargaining 
and sentencing practices. With this analysis we found confirmation of our original 
hypothesis: at the statewide level, while Proposition 8 did cause a statistically 
significant increase in the use of certified pleas, in practical terms it was only a 
very slight increase beyond the level that would have likely been attained had the law 
not been implemented. In other words, Proposition 8 may have merely hastened a trend 
towards the disposition of felony cases in municipal court that was already underway. 
In two of the three jurisdictions that were examined in more detail, Proposition 8 
apparently had little effect on plea bargaining practices. In contrast, Alameda County 
responded to the law with a sudden shift of plea negotitions out of superior court and 
into municipal court. However, even in Alameda County, the statistical evidence 
suggests that this process was under way, albeit to a lesser degree, before Proposition 
8. 
We also found no support for the prediction, made by early advocates of the "Victims' 
Bill of Rights," that the law would result in more persons being sentenced to prison. 
It appears that the post-8 pattern of increased imprisonment, both of convicted "serious 
offenders" and "non-serious offenders," was the continuation of an earlier trend. 
Moreover, the fact that the use of probation and jail sentences remained fairly stable 
in the last three years of the series (1982 to 1984) suggests that prosecutors and 
judges, in the face of public outcries for more punitive sentences, have held to a 
consistent view of the appropriate punishments for relatively minor offenders. 
These empirical findings provide support for our theoretical position Lhat the impact of 
any law on the criminal justice system is limited or bounded by the internal 
organizational dynamics at work within the various agencies that comprise that system. 
Change in the criminal justice system must come from within and will meet strong 
opposition if it is forced on the system from without. What this implies for future 




The number of felony complaint requests rejected by prosecutors as a 
proportion of all felony arrests statewide, increased from 14 percent in 1978 to 18.5 
percent in 1983 (Source: Offender Based Transaction Statistics data, 1978-1983). 
2 The word "trend" is used here in its broadest, everyday sense, i.e., to mean a 
systematic change in the level of a series of data points, As our later discussion 
reveals, in terms of Ordinary Least Squares regression, all the series are trending 
or have a strong, positive slope, implying deterministic behavior. However, in our 
time-series analysis we differenced the series, thereby removing the trend or the 
drift (probabilistic behavior due to random forces) without making a distinction 
between the two. 
3 The California Board of Prison Terms collects data on prison sentences but at 
the date of this writing their data do not cover an adequate time period for the 
purposes of this study. 
4 One technique is described by Carolyn Block in Descriptive Time-Series 
Analysis for Criminal Justice Decision Makers (Chicago: Illinois Law Enforcement 
Commission, 1979). 
5 For the original mathematical statement see, G.E. Box and G.M. Jenkins, Time-
Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1976). For 
more specific social science applications see Richard McCleary and Richard Hay, 
Applied Time-Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976). 
6 Two other urban counties which showed a similar increase were Santa Clara and 
San Francisco. In Santa Clara, the proportion of felony cases entering superior 
court as certified pleas increased from 26 percent in 1981 to 63 percent in 1984. In 
San Francisco, that rate increased from 13.4 percent in 1980 to 36.5 percent in 
1984. Consistent with the findings of this study an early analysis of the impact of 
Proposition 8 on plea in San Francisco, conducted by the Public Defender's 
Office there, concluded that plea bargaining of felony cases in the municipal 
courts was in high gear before Proposition 8 took effect. If the practice did 
anything, it accomodated in getting around Proposition 8's restrictions on 
felony plea bargaining." Source: San Francisco Public Defender's Office, "The 
Impact of Proposition 8 on Sentencing and Dispositions in San Francisco Superior 
Court," unpublished report [1983], p. 3) 
7 Both the "serious felony" and the "other felony" series contained a 
significant outlier at the sixty-ninth observation. After checking the OBTS data 
against data from the Alameda Superior Courts we concluded that the outlier was an 
error and replaced it with a value equaling the average of the value at the point 
immediateley preceding and the point immediately following the outlier. 
8 See note 26, Chapter 3. 
9 George Deukmejian, quoted in 
Secretary of State, 1982). 
1° California Department of Corrections, 
(Sacramento, 1983). 
(Sacramento: 
Population Projections, 1983-1987 
11 That law permits judges who sentence adult offenders under age 21 to the 
Department of Corrections to specify that they serve their sentence in a CYA facility 
until they are age 25. 
12 Supra, Chap. 1 
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Kenneth Polk, "Rape Reform and Criminal .Justice Processing," Crime and 
Delinquenc~, 31, No. 2 (1985 , 194. 
14 See Note 10 supra, P. 7. 
15 These sentences and the sentences in the "combined state incarceration rate" 
represent most, but not all, superior court sentences recorded in the OBTS data. In 
1980, sentences of death, fines, to California Rehabilitation Centers, and other 
sentences comprise approximately l percent of all superior court dispositions. 
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We should be clear here that we are not asserting that prison commitments or the 
number of prisoners in state prisons has n~ increased in recent years. To the 
conL rary, stattstics from the Department of Corrections show Lhat the number of 
lncarcerated felons increased dramatically from 18,502 in 1978 to 40,648 in 1984. 
(Source: California Department of Corrections, Population Projections, 1984.) We do 
not dispute the fact that part of this increase resulted from the increased use of 
prison sentences to punish offenders, but we do contend that the data do not indicate 




IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSITION 8 
ADMINISTRATION 
JUSTICE 
Empirical impact studies of new legislation often share a common logical flow, They 
describe the text and perhaps the background of the new law, then study how it was 
administered and obeyed, and they highlight the great difference between "law 
on the books" and "law in Simplistic interpretations follow: this "gap" 
shows either that law is an impotent method of controlling behavior or that inept and 
corrupt legal professionals inevitably thwart the will of the people as expressed in the 
law. 
By contrast, this study did not set out to assess the difference between what 
Proposition 8 mandated and what actually happened. We simply intended to describe what 
actually did happen, regardless of what the diffuse intent of the law's drafters may 
have bee~ It is clear, for example, that Proposition 8 addressed the topic of plea 
bargaining, mandating that it be more limited than it was before the law passed, but 
whether its drafters intended to shift bargaining to lower courts by omitting the word 
"complaint" from the plea bargaining prohibition is a matter of speculation. What this 
study has found is that plea bargaining is migrating to municipal courts in several 
counties, which may or may not have been the intent of Proposition 8. 
Two important issues emerge from this finding. First, did Proposition 8 cause this 
shift and other observed changes in felony adjudication? Second, assuming that these 
observations in several counties paint an accurate picture of current felony processes 
in California, are these changes good for the quality of justice administered in 
criminal courts? In addressing the latter question, one approach usually adopted in 
impact studies is helpful; how closely court professionals adhere to the "will of the 
people" is an important inquiry when evaluating legislation passed by popular 
initiative. In a democratic society, the quality of justice is evaluated partly by 
whether courts strive to uphold values deemed important by the lay citizenry. This 
chapter addresses these issues. 
It was easier to say in the preceding chapters what P=oposition 8 did not accomplish 
than to state what effects it actually had on California's ustice system, It did not 
end plea bargaining, and it probably did not increase the severity of felony sentences. 
It may have caused a shift in guilty plea processes to lower courts, however, which in 
itself has important implications for the administration of justice. Finally, it may 
have served a social or political function, by assuring the voters that "something is 
being done" about criminal justice. If so, the assurance will be short-lived, because 
citizen dissatisfaction with plea bargaining is likely to be exacerbated by the changes 
in that practice currently underway in California courts. 
Review: The Empirical Findings 
Did Proposition 8 end plea bargaining in serious felony cases? Unequivocally: no. On 
the basis of our qualitative and quantitative data in three jurisdictions and on the 
basis of statewide quantitative data, we conclude that plea bargaining is just as 
essential to criminal prosecution as it ever was. While the location of this bargaining 
and the procedures surrounding it changed in response to the law, overt negotiation over 
case dispositions among defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges remains the 
predominant method for disposing of criminal cases in California. These discussions 
usually occur in informal meetings between counsel or in more formal give-and-take in 
judges' chambers. Actual court hearings accomplish little in the guilty plea process 
except in those cases that proceed through a municipal court preliminary hearing, where 
witnesses and evidence are presented and evaluated; or cases that proceed to superior 
court, where evidentiary motions may be made. 
Did the habitual offender enhancements mandated by Proposition 8 result in longer, more 
severe sentences for recidivists? With less certainty: probably not. We remain 
somewhat cautious in this conclusion because we were unable to determine exactly how 
many offenders were eligible for the Penal Code 667(a) five-year sentencing 
enhancement. However, available data suggest that many of those eligible are not 
charged with the enhancement, and that when the enhancement is charged, it is frequently 
not imposed. For that very small proportion of offenders against whom the enhancement 
is actually imposed, however, it is plausible that the legislation may have increased 
their sentences dramatically. 
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Furthermore, our local data provide strong evidence that, for the entire group of 
persons iaitially with serious felonies (:1.ot just those eligible for habitual 
offender sente:1.cing severity did not increase after the implementation 
of Proposition 8. The likelihood that serious offenders would be sent to prison, 
while increasing in the post-Proposition 8 period, did not increase any more than 
would have been expected had Proposition 8 been passed. Most of the observed 
increase in the probability likely caused by the shift of 
offenders other state prisons, rather than by a 
decrease in probation county jail. 
Yet, criminal justice and criminal prosecution in California have definitely changed 
now dispose of a far greater since the passage of 8. 
proportion of the felony 
that a person charged 
prison has increased 
8 cause these 
Causal Connections: 
Proposition Also, the probability 
felo!1Y will be sentenced to 
passed. Did Proposition 
Courtwork 
Causality is a social phenomena is quite 
different from making about physical phenomena. One cannot say 
that a law "caused" people's behavior to change the same that one can say that 
a combination of certain chemicals temperatures an explosion. 
The difference is that social events are always contextual and historical. That is, 
they always occur in context events that influence how people interpret 
their meaning and how people interpretations. Moreover, they are always 
unique; their occurrence duplicated, Because of these 















Section 1192.7 prohibits plea 
jurisdictions where the 
evident for all felony cases rather 
that prosecutors and judges 
conform Lo the letter 
organizational 
court. Thus, 
underway even before 
generally regarded the law as a 
to observed changes in 
it could be that 
processes in which cause 
star1dards 
created and responded to an 
municipal court. Some 
, although Penal Code 
"serious felony" cases, in those 
lower court occurred, the pattern was 
"serious felonies." This suggests 
negotiations to lower courts not solely to 
because they found it in their 
as possible before superior 
hastened a process that was 
on the ballot. 
Similarly, enhancing the sente'lces who have previously commit ted serious 
offenses could also be continuation of trends begun in the late 1970's. Every year 
since the institutiotl of determinate sentetlcing i:1 1977, increasingly severe 
punishments have been mandated for a growi:1g number of crimes, lengthening the range 
of potential sentences for offenders. Adding the list of sentencing enhancements 
increases the power prosecutors exert in the plea bargaining process, for it is 
entirely within the prosecutor's to charge or not to charge these 
enhancements. The new hahitual Proposition 8 has continued 
this shift of power the by adding a powerful weapon to the 
prosecutorial arsenal, even seldom used. Conversely, the law has 
lessened the influence of those jurisdictions where they remain 
"dominant figures in the plea bargaining In those cases where the five-year 
habitual offender e'1hancemenls come play, the "deal," part of which may include 
dropping the PC 667(a) charges, has probably been struck before it reaches the 
judge. 
This does not prove that the law's framers were aware of these trends and tailored 
Proposition 8 to meet these organizational interests, nor does it disprove it. The most 
that can definitely be said is that criminal justice professionals did not strenuously 
oppose Proposition 8 -- with the exception of some vocal displeasure from the defense 
bar concerning certain provisions of the wide-ranging law and that this probably 
aided the initiatives chances for passage in the voting booth. Most justice 
professionals probably assumed that their organizations were already in substantial 
compliance with the law, as San Diego courthouse workers related and as the District 
Attorney's written plea bargaining guidelines indicated. Court workers in Los Angeles 
County, too, assumed they already complied with the law because the exceptions listed in 
it essentially enunciated the reasons they would plea bargain, anyway. In other 
counties, court professionals went even further; they responded by conscientiously 
altering certain practices within already-existing organizational structures to comport 
with the actual wording of the statute. Oakland prosecutors are a good example of this 
response. 
This raises an impact question not directly discussed in preceding chapters. Did 
criminal justice professionals subvert or evade Proposition 8? Emphatically: no. But 
neither did they experiment with some of the more unusual interpretations of this vague 
law, e.g., an outright ban on plea bargaining, offered by its champions. In brief, they 
responded as well as they could to confusing legislation. Their responses, predictably, 
supported their own organizational interests. 
Symbolic Politics and Criminal Justice Reform 
We have described the effect of Proposition 8 on the outcomes of prosecution and on the 
organizational structures within which guilty pleas are elicited. This tracks the work 
of courthouse professionals: judges, lawyers, probation and corrections personnel. But 
popular initiatives like Proposition 8 or, to a lesser extent, the Determinate 
Sentencing Law and similar legislation currently exerting an influence on California 
criminal justice, imply a distrust of court professionals' work. Indeed, Proposition 
8's proponents promised in campaign arguments that the new law would thwart "soft-headed 
judges" and "conniving defense attorneys" who twist the justice system toward a concern 
for defendants' rights instead of victims' rights. 
We believe that voters' perceptions of criminal adjudication involve more than a simple-
minded, mean-spirited distrust of legal professionals. Rather, many voters perceive the 
primary motivation behind plea bargaining to be organizational, bureaucratic 
imperatives. They believe that judges and prosecutors urge guilty pleas to clear 
crowded dockets and caseloads, and that defenders convince clients to plead guilty 
because their fees would not compensate them for trial work. They believe that 
sentences are lenient because the system trades severe, "just" sentences for organi-
zational efficiency. 
It is entirely plausible that this and similar reasoning
2 
was crucial to citizens who 
voted to "ban" plea bargaining. Perhaps it was not the fact of guilty pleas, but the 
perception of leniency associated with them, that motivated the vote. 
The proponents of "get tough" laws understand this dynamic well. In the
3 
words of 
political scientist Murray Edelman, they deal in "symbolic politics." The high 
likelihood that such legislation will be merely a matter of "symbolic politics" 
constructed by moral entrepreneurs who are aware that such laws will arouse and then 
soothe the public -- while still allowing practitioners to continue with "business as 
usual" raises serious questions about whether legal change initiated by parties 
outside the system can proceed very far. 
Although its advocates proclaimed the "Victims' Bill of Rights" to be a measure that 
would overcome the dominance of liberal legal professionals in criminal adjudication, 
restrictions on plea negotiations and judicial authority to drop sentence enhancements 
have merely resulted in shifting discretion to other points in the system. Surely this 
was predictable by anyone remotely familiar with the workings of the criminal justice 
system. Yet, even well-informed voters, who realize that guilty pleas cannot and should 
not be forbidden, nevertheless would vote for laws like Proposition 8 to communicate 
their concern about crime and 
4 
their displeasure with justice professionals 
representation of the public interest. 
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The "symbolic" character of Proposition 8 also raises the question of whether serious 
and well-meaning efforts at changing our system of justice and eventually reducing 
intolerably high rates of crime can succeed within such highly politicized 
environments, If the public comes to believe that ending plea bargaining and raising 
the penalties for certain offenders is all that is necessary to both improve justice 
and reduce crime, then innovative but delicate policies to accomplish those ends may 
never be implemented. Furthermore, the "faddish" character of criminal justice 
legislation may, as one interviewed legislator predicted, prevent needed legislation 
from being introduced "if crime is the voters minds that year." Of course, 
this problem infects all crime and justice
5
administration issues 
seem particularly susceptible to these poll politics." 
There are many reasons why Proposition 8's supporters could have proposed the law and 
worked hard to convince voters to pass it. We must assume the best -- that they 
sincerely believed it would improve the criminal justice system, probably by slowly 
shifting more power to prosecutors. Yet it is clear, also, that the issue was 
presented to the voters in a manner that played upon their fear of crime and distrust 
of legal professionals. Years later, when citizens observe that the law did not 
achieve what they thought it would -- that plea bargaining continues, for example, 
and is even accomplished with less public scrutiny than before -- their mistrust of 
the courthouse is understandably validated and deepened. 
Citizens' Distrust of Court 
We have concluded that plea bargaining changed under Proposition 8 in several 
counties, over half the felony cases are now concluded through guilty pleas in 
municipal courts -- and that sentencing did not become appreciably more s5vere for 
convicted defendants, who were initially charged with serious felonies. We have 
also concluded that, far from evading the plea bargaining limitation, legal 
professionals carefully considered the new legislation and conscientiously 
incorporated it into court procedures. 
Ironically, however, this professional response has served only to strengthen those 
very elements bargaining that engender public distrust of the practice. Of 
course, plea bargaining will be popular in a system that promises every 
defendant 7he right to Lrial. Furthermore, an implicit theme, as well as a separate 
provision, in of Rights" is that victims deserve a trial, too --
in the sense that "have a day in court" to confront 
the people who harmed sentence offenders as they 
do. 
When guilty plea courts, defendants are encouraged 
to plead guilty very Lhei r arraignments. Fewer cases proceed through 
preliminary examination, usually the only opportunity short of trial for 
victims and witnesses to stories or for defenders to offer exculpatory 
evidence in open court. result a plea bargaining "ban" has been 
to encourage legal professionals felony cases so quickly that citizens 
have little opportunity either examine influence felony adjudication. Voters' 
tendency to view plea bargaining as nefarious marketplace in which lawyers and 
judges trade justice for organizational efficiency can only be reinforced by this 
recent development. 
If voters' major objection to bargaining is that legal professiortals deal in 
guilty pleas in order to lessen the load on their own orga:1izations, their criticism 
deserves careful examination. (There are other reasons plea bargaining is opposed, 
and they are discussed below.) Shifting guilty plea processes to municipal court, 
while permissible under the terms of Proposition 8 and rational under organizational 
dynamics, is primarily an efficiency measure. It is that very efficiency that raises 
suspicion among voters. 
It seems counter-intuitive to do~grade a value that is ordinarily considered a great 
good in organizations. Any public bureaucracy or private corporation strives for 
efficiency to conserve scarce resources and reach important goals. But the product 
of courts is not manufactured it is justice. important aspects, justice 
often conflicts with efficiency. 
The court workers interviewed for this study unanimously denied that organizational 
efficiency or administrative convenience was a primary consideration in plea 
negotiation. Dozens of prosecutors and defense attorneys, for example, filled out 
questionnaires in which they were asked what factors were most influential in plea 
bargaining. If the district attorney agrees to recommend a sentence acceptable to the 
defendant, for instance, what factors are typically most important in reaching that 
decision? Both defenders and prosecutors overwhelmingly agreed: the strength of 
evidence and the witnesses likely to be at trial were the most important 
factors; followed by the seriousness of the case, the defendant's prior criminal record, 
and whether this would be just and fair outcome both for the defendant and the 
community. (The lawyers diverged a bit in their rankings of these three factors.) 
Ranked even lower was "the quality and/or personality of defense counsel or trial judge" 
and, behind that, "availability of courtrooms and incarceration space." Rated last was 
"case overload in the District Attorney's Office." 
Clearly, these professionals heatedly deny that they trade sentences in order to clear 
court dockets. They are not lying; rather, they are describing their work-worlds as 
they interpret them. They are legal professionals, and the most important factors to 
them involve their court skills and legal knowledge, as expressed in their capacity to 
predict what will happen at trial. They perform "triage," much as medical 
professionals in hospital emergency rooms diagnose and separate cases for later 
treatment. These lawyers can generally diagnose defendants; they know how serious a 
case is and what course its "disease" is likElv to take. It is a natural behavioral 
response for them to agree to conclude both "Jeadbang" and lightweight cases quickly and 
to spend their energy on "treatment" of the more difficult defendants. 
Yet victims and witnesses do not share this professional knowledge. To them, the more 
"deadbang" a case and the more blameworthy the defendant, the more attention is 
deserved. When the prosecutor and/or judge quickly dispose of a case because "there is 
nothing to argue about," citizens interpret this organizationally efficient move as mere 
administrative convenience. 
This is not to say §hat all victims long for a day in court, In fact, many find it to 
be a great burden. What it does say is that citizens suspect any decision made behind 
closed doors, particularly when the professionals themselves say that they quickly 
dispose of "easy" cases. Publicity -- in the sense of "making a matter public" -- is an 
important democratic value for courts as well as legislatures. 
In sum, court workers separate their work by degree of difficulty and devote 
extra attention to the 
normal behavioral response of 
corporation, for instance, 
streamline" his or her workload. 
it is indeed the administrative 
bargaining in the lay public. 
routinized workload is comparable to the 
organization. (Any manager in a private 
carefully trained to "prioritize and 
response, but, in a subtle way, 
convenience which raises such distrust of plea 
The problem is that the citizens' vision courts efficiency imperative is overblown. 
Prosecutors do not plea bargain in order to clear their desks, but they do plea bargain 
in order to prioritize their work. Unfortunately, citizens receive the impression that 
an overloaded court system drops cases simply to get rid of them. In turn, voters are 
likely to become skeptical and disillusioned because they perceive the sentences affixed 
to these "dropped cases" to be too light. And if sentences seem too light, voters are 
likely to blame either corrupt plots or overburdened courts. 
Both these versions of plea bargaining -- the courts' administrative triage and the 
citizens' organizational overload are based on observations of justice system 
efficiency. One is simply a more realistic and behaviorally subtle version of the 
other. When citizens criticize courts for being more interested in efficiency than in 
justice, then this is not necessarily a spurious argument. When they take another step, 
believing that lenient sentences are exchanged for clear desks, the argument breaks 
down. 
For some victims, of course, opinions of the justice system do not arise from thoughtful 
assessments of court efficiency; many people blame courts for not achieving revenge in 
victims' names, or for not fighting the moral disorder crime represents, or for ignoring 
any of a number of other important but murky desires. No sentence seems harsh enough to 
a person who has been wounded. The victim does not understand that this 
crime is measured and weighed in comparison to many other similar crimes 
and defendants, and that the outcome is the "going rate" for this type 
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of case. Citizens judges and attorneys 
respond: "Lenient compared to what?" , criticize plea bargaining 
for bestowing low sentences simply because district attorneys cannot prove the 
cases. If so, the professionals respond, the problem is not in plea bargaining, but 
in the law itself. The law demands that nobody be convicted of a crime unless the 
state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed it. 
In fact, plea 
perspective -- not 
evidence against 
in a public trial, 




these defendants are 

























the law. If the 
then should be examined 
or perhaps convicted of a 
proven. Plea bargaining allows 
quickly sentence defendants whose cases 
in this light, plea bargaining does not 
people who otherwise might not be 
standards upon which the law is 
all washes out" that 
a guilty plea allows the state to 
punishment attached, while a blameworthy 
over details.) 
efficiency for leniency or that 
shift felony guilty pleading to 
bargaining, as Proposition 8's 
for every defendant. But it may 
definitely requires careful development 
case. Proposition ironically, has 
in Chapter 
preliminary hearing, 
One of the effects of 











criminal and correctional 
investigations into 
on these facts, 
"pre-preliminary" 
The judicial counties. Of 
course, the guilty plea 
cases to , case the sentence 
negotiated in superior court judges seldom second-guess the 
decisions of their colleagues. When the municipal court judge agrees to 
accept the guilty plea and affix either a sentence suggested by the attorneys or a 
sentence agreed upon after in-chambers discussion with both attorneys present, this 
is the only painstaking review case is likely to receive. 
If defendants in the sense that due 
process means are missing from 
this pre-preliminary First, in some (but by no 
means in all) cases, the information attorneys and judges make evidentiary 
and sentencing judgments is too , the important value of "publicity" --
of public airing and system accountability the citizenry -- is ignored. These 
values would be less attenuated if felony defendants were permitted to plead guilty 
in municipal court only after preliminary hearings. 
Due process is a slippery concept, but it underlies our entire jurisprudential 
framework. This report is not an appropriate place to plumb the philosophical meaning 
of that value, but it is important simply to state here that due process encompasses the 
"right to trial" -- perhaps not in the sense that every case must be tried, but that 
every case, at least, must be completely investigated and weighed. Due process also 
means that there must be a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence. It is here 
that the idea of publicity arises: opposing attorneys may develop and challenge evidence 
between themselves at the stage of prosecution, but if the case is 
then quickly concluded with a guilty plea, how will anyone but the attorneys and the 
judge know that this challenge has occurred? The opportunity to see the evidence and 
understand its implications is important both to the defendant and to the citizenry. 
Attorneys understandably argue that they know their cases and their clients, and that 
early guilty pleas are entirely appropriate when a case is "deadbang." However, in a 
small but significant number of cases the facts upon which this professional judgement 
is based have not been fully developed. 
Cases concluding with guilty pleas in municipal court are often certified within a week 
of arraignment. A few stark facts available at that stage, such as a defendant's 
criminal record or availability of articulate and reliable witnesses, may seem 
sufficiently weighty so that a guilty plea is inevitable. But these facts should be 
challenged and weighed against other case facts as carefully as are facts in "close 
call" cases. All participants must be fully satisfied not only that these facts are 
accurate but that they ''stack up" against other facts to justify a guilty plea and --
perhaps most important -- the sentence based on it. 
To the attorneys' assertion that "Only deadbang cases are disposed of through certified 
guilty pleas," the skeptical rejoinder is "But how do you know it's really deadbang, 
unless you investigate more?" Of course, the majority probably are indeed cases where 
evidence of guilt is virtually unassailable, but this generality ignores those few 
defendants cases which turn out, on closer inspection, to have some life after all. It 
is the concern that no defendant be wrongfully convicted or, more realistically, that 
no defendant be convicted of a crime or given a sentence at variance with what his 
provable actions deserve -- that has justified Anglo-American jurisprudence's tenacious 
belief in careful adversary evidentiary testing. It may not be efficient to worry about 
a small number of individuals with problematic cases who otherwise would be swept along 
with the large group of cases labeled "deadbang", but our courts have traditionally 
interpreted due process to mean that individuals have the right to challenge the group 
label. 
Careful investigation and evidentiary challenge not only facts pointing to the 
guilt of the accused, but also to his her sentence. When the municipal court judge 
accepts or helps formulate a negotiated sentence in a guilty plea case, there is little 
opportunity to review a defendant' personal characteristics which may influence 
decisions concerning appropriate punishment. Under the Determinate Sentencing Act and 
its implicit rejection of the notion of rehabilitation as goal of sentencing, there 
may seem to be no other alternative. But determinate sentencing may legally be 
influenced by mitigating and aggravating factors drawn from the character of the 
defendant as well as the facts of the crime. 
The law says that factors relating to the defendant, his or her background and history, 
and prognosis for benefiting from various punitive alternatives must be presented to the 
sentencing judge in a presentence report prepared by the probation department. If a 
defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced in municipal court, there is scant opportunity 
to consider the information prepared and presented in this report. 
It may be argued that the superior court judge who later reviews the sentences emanating 
from municipal court will review the probation report, thus complying with the Penal 
Code mandate that these factors be considered in setting the sentence. But, in at least 
two of the counties we studied, since the lower court sentence is essentially a fait 
accompli overturned only in the most unusual cases by the superior court, there is--rll 
practice no meaningful opportunity to incorporate the probation department 
recommendations into municipal court felony sentencfBg. Probation workers report that 
this is a great source of professional frustration. 
Finally, due process means, among other things, 
defendant who insists on this and other rights will 
the system strongly encourages the guilty 
sentence for it. The dynamics of the defendant's 
the right to confront accusers. 
simply refuse to plead guilty, 
plea by implicitly promising a 









system undermines due process in that decision have been hotly debated 
elsewhere. Proposition 8 adds a new element to the debate: due process may involve 
some measure of process for victims, too. 
Process does not guarantee outcome. If "victims' rights" is taken to mean heavy, 
vengeful sentences, this is a distortion of the idea of rights. But if due process 
means the right of confrontation and the right to bring forth evidence and test it, 
the ideal applies to everyone. Although a has no legally enforceable "right" 
to an evidentiary hearing, the logic of due process encourages prosecutors, judges 
and defenders to give the public its due, too. Defendants and witnesses alike must 
confront the evidence in open court, both because justice is their concern as well as 
the concern of legal professionals, because everyone can thereby be satisfied 
that justice has been done. 
The Possibility of 
Proposition 8 was important legislation because it served symbolic needs in the 
populace and because, we believe, it did indeed affect court procedures, It did so 
because the change it demanded was incremental: a small but perceptible shift in the 
proportion of guilty pleas taken at early stages of prosecution. Change was possible 
because this was not too difficult for court organizations to accommodate, and most 
court actors had their own organizational reasons obey the actual wording of the 
law, 
To say that change was accomplished incrementally, however, is not to say that it was 
trivial. On the contrary, the shift of felony guilty plea processes to municipal 
courts has had serious repercussions for the quality of justice in California. 
Proposition 8 and related laws a subtle redistribution of power among 
court workers in felony prosecution, our understanding of the nature of 
plea bargaining and due process, have affected professionals' concept of 
justice -- the shifting moral calculus upon which workers base their notions of 
the right way to do their 
When felony guilty plea processes 
counties this represents a 
and concommitant constriction of 
prosecutorial functions 
been considered to be 
outcomes increases, 
plea bargaining 
between counsel at that 
we believe that 
undermined when 
earlier stages of adjudication, most 
of the power of the district attorney 
Charging and investigation are 
in what has traditionally 
control over sentencing 
the "pre-preliminary" 
the sentence formulated 
Nevertheless, 
evaluating evidence, is 
hearing. 
The more felony cases that are concluded at the "pre-preliminary" stage, the fewer 
will proceed through preliminary examination in municipal court, much less through 
superior court examinations. have argued that harms the value of due 
process, where due process is conceived as opportunity to investigate the crime 
and the defendant and then to present and challenge the evidence publicly, There is 
no opportunity for citizens to know whether legal professionals have represented the 
larger public interest in plea negotiation over particular cases. Only court 
hearings and discussions with prosecutors who, after all, have the public as their 
clients -- can accomplish that. 
Contrary to the usual doomsaying about the possibility of legislative impact, we 
believe that legislation can indeed encourage a subtle but critical change in legal 
professionals' conceptions of "what process is due. When laws encourage quick 
resolution of felony cases, attorneys and judges slowly begin to agree that 
preliminary hearings are unnecessary. Though no attorney would go so far as to say 
that investigation or interv:i.ewing clients is unnecessary, court procedures can 
create an atmosphere: a statement of what is an acceptable professional standard in 
courtwork. If prosecutorial events where evidence is brought forth and publicly 
tested are slowly de-emphasized, the professional work necessary to prepare for those 
events is also slowly downgraded, Almost imperceptibly, conceptions of "good 
lawyering" and it becomes normal to prepare cases carefully but not to "go 
that extra in fully all a defendant's case. 
This would be so, partly because there is no court actor whose organizational interests 
collide with the slow slide toward quick felony guilty pleas. Prosecutors believe cases 
are fully considered and fairly concluded under their system of legal triage. Judges 
carefully review evidence, but the split between municipal court and superior court 
fragments the information and work roles available to the judiciary. Defense attorneys 
must serve the short-term interests of their clients; when an acceptable sentence is 
offered to a defendant at an early stage of processing, it is the attorney's 
professional duty to accept it (especially organizational signals are that the 
sentence will significantly increase later process.) All court professionals 
with the exception of probation workers, whose seriously undermined by lower 
court plea bargaining -- have organizational municipal court guilty 
pleas. 
Mather has described "mavericks" in the system: professionals who refuse to accept the 
prevailing definition of normal adjudication and normal instead demanding 
painstaking and frustrating consideration of every case. The mavericks she described 
in her book on Los Angeles adjudication were defense attorneys who refused to plead 
clients guilty. Convinced that the state should explicitly prove every crime element 
and every factual allegation, these attorneys believed this necessary partly because it 
would prevent long-term degeneration of the justice system. But it is perhaps too much 
to ask of the defense bar that they sacrifice the short-term interests of their clients 
for the long-term interests of justice. 
Alternatively, municipal court judges could become mavericks, refusing to accept the 
guilty plea agreements formulated between counsel at early stages of prosecution. But a 
powerful organizational disincentive is evident: if they refuse to accept these guilty 
pleas, they will have to preside over preliminary hearings in every case. This would 
represent a substantial investment of judicial energy that few courts would be willing 
to expend. "Pre-preliminary" guilty pleas thus become normal to all system actors. 
However, if legislation can encourage a in the courtroom's distribution of power 
and in conceptions of appropriate, adjudication by encouraging guilty pleas 
before preliminary hearings, legislation could also constrain "pre-preliminary" 
procedures. In the end, the only organizational actor with an interest in holding 
public hearings in every felony case may be the public itself. Legislation, it seems, 
is a never-ending process. 
Conclusions 
Clearly, the preference expressed in this interpretation of the observed impact of 
Proposition 8 is that most felony cases should weather a municipal court preliminary 
hearing before the court would accept a guilty plea. There is no provision written in 
the Penal Code providing for a procedural stage preliminary examination, whereby a 
municipal court judge could certify a case to superior court for sentencing. On the 
other hand, there is no Penal Code definition of the "pre-preliminary" stage, yet local 
county courts across the state have formulated a guilty plea event at this stage. 
This study of Proposition 8 demonstrates that one effect of 
highlight guilty plea processes occuring before preliminary 
that this was the intent of the legislation's drafters, 
consideration for the justice system is that this has 
regardless of the law's intent. 
that legislation has been to 
examination. It is possible 
although the most important 
actually been the effect, 
Another observed impact of Proposition 8 is that discretion has indeed shifted, as many 
citizens probably desired. Legislation like Proposition 8 is profoundly anti-
professional, aimed at limiting the discretion enjoyed by justice system workers. 
Whether it makes sense to legal professionals to limit judicial discretion or to 
distrust prosecutorial plea bargaining evaluations, this is indeed a crucial underlying 
impetus in popular legislation like Proposition 8. We have tried to explain this 
dynamic both from the professionals' and from the citizens' viewpoints, and have 
concluded that a more "public" justice system, in the sense of a more open justice 
system, would foster political legitimacy and accountability to the public. 
Finally, Proposition 8 should be viewed in the context of many similar legislative 
adjustments designed to shift discretion within the criminal justice system. Power has 
probably been slightly redistributed, a development which should be carefully examined 
in light of its long-term effects on the courts. Criminologists often note that 
legislation can shift discretion but cannot eliminate it. The next logical conclusion 
seems to be that it is therefore useless to legislate. 
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On the contrary, the saga of Proposition 8's plea bargaining limitation and habitual 
offender enhancements demonstrates that legislation matters. When discretion is 
shifted, this motion has its 0~1 consequences. It is not value-neutral. In the case 
of Proposition 8, the shift of discretion into early prosecutorial stages in 
municipal court distorts the justice system's capacity to realize important 
democratic values of due process. Ironically, the values many supporters of 
Proposition 8 treasured most complete and public evidentiary testing, an 
opportunity for both victims and defendants to confront the evidence and understand 
the outcomes of adjudication -- have been undermined. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
Quantitative Data Sources 
A. Offender Based Transaction Statistics Data 
The principal source of quantitative data for this study was the Offender-Based 
Transaction Statistics (OBTS) system maintained by the California Bureau of Criminal 
Statistics. These data track the progress of all persons arrested on felony charges 
in California through the criminal justice system. The data record the disposition 
for each individual defendant at each stage in the process -- law enforcement, 
prosecution, lower courts and superior courts. The OBTS data base annually records 
information for around 200,000 felony arrests, approximately seventy percent of all 
recorded felony arrests. Although an underreporting rate of thirty percent is 
rather high, the level remains fairly constant over Lime and, as comparisons with 
other sources of court data suggest, levels of disposition reporting from the courts 
may be higher than they are at the prosecution and law enforcement levels. Since 
all of the OBTS data used in this study concern court dispositions, we have 
increased confidence in the completeness of the data, 
The OBTS data are reported annually in the form of "fall out" charts that display 
the attrition of cases at each stage in the prosecution process. Our methodological 
strategy was to break down these yearly data into monthly <:ounts thereby producing 
enough observations for a time-series analysis. The data refer to cases reaching 
final disposition in a certain month, regardless of when the case began. Because of 
the large numbers of cases recorded annually statewide, the cells referring to 
particular disposition types within the monthly samples remain large and show 
considerable stability month-to-month. At the county level, however, the monthly 
dispositions show increased variance. By focusing on several of the largest 
counties in the state where the monthly samples remained relatively large, the 
effects of this problem were minimized. 
An additional operation had to be performed on the data before they could be 
analyzed. Before 1982, those OBTS dispositions received after a cut-off date in the 
spring of each year were "up-dated" to the following year. This meant that, for 
example, a 1981 disposition received after the cut-off date in 1982 would be 
included in the 1982 file and would appear as a 1982 disposition. For the years 
1980, 1981, and part of 1982, between fifteen and twenty percent of all dispositions 
were updated to a subsequent year. In this study we were concerned with changes in 
disposition patterns at specific points in time, therefore we had to move the up-
dated dispositions back to the actual year in which they occurred. 
The OBTS data record the "most-serious charge" at arrest and conviction. This 
charge is determined by a hierarchy system used by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics 
that ranks offenses by the severity of their possible penalties. All of the OBTS 
data analyzed in this study were categorized on lhe basis of the "most serious 
charge at ar:rest." In making the decision to generate samples based on this charge 
rather than the conviction charge, we concurred with Casper et al., that "The arrest 
charge both constr:ains eventual dispositions and best measures the seriousness of 
the original charged offense." 
Several problems were encountered in assembling data matching the description of 
"serious felonies" found in the text of Proposition 8. First, while the law refers 
to "residential burglaries," the Penal Code makes no such distinction. Arrest and 
disposition data also do not distinguish between residential and commercial 
burglaries. Official crime statistics show that two-thirds of all reported 
burglaries are residential and we assume that a similar proportion of burglary 
arrests are for residential burglaries. However, we included disposition data on 
all burglaries, knowing that approximately one-third would not be classified as 
"serious felonies," because the benefits of including this sizeable category of 
offenses outweigh the disadvantages of having a small proportion of cases 
miscategorized as "serious felonies." 
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Secondly, Penal Code Section 1192.7 defines "any felony in which the defendant 
personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon" as a "serious felony." This 
distinction is typically made after arrest with the addition of a specific 
enhancement to the original Data from the Bureau of Criminal Statistics 
(OBTS data) do not enhancements. Therefore, we were unable to 
include these cases in 
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individual convicted 
times, Also, OBTS 
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, these data are complimentary and can be used 
their differences. 
Detailed sentencing data individual jurisdictions were not available from any 
state agency. Therefore, we turned to local criminal justice agencies and their 
in-house information systems for these data. 
In Alameda County we were fortunate enough to gain access to CORPUS, a county-
wide criminal justice information system that records, among other data, the 
dispositions for all lower and superior court cases, Although the system is 
typically used to locate individual cases and not to produce statistics, we were 
able to use it to generate the data necessary for our study. From the CORPUS 
system we obtained data on all recorded felony cases that reached final 
disposition between , 1978 and December 31, 1984, in which one of the 
charges in the complaint was one of eight "serious felonies": robbery, murder, 
manslaughter, rape, child abuse, arson, sodomy and kidnap. These offenses were 
selected because they represent those "serious felonies" that occur with 
considerable frequency every The dispositional data for each of these 
cases -- indicati~g outcomes proceeding, final disposition and sentence 
-- were listed on a hard hard copy, cases in which the "most 
serious" charge was were manually coded and reentered into a 
computer file. 
Equivalent sets 
JURIS system and 
data on the same 
period of time were 
generated yielding 
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of the impact 
month) was spent 
prosecutors to he 
from the San Diego District Attorney's 
District Attorney's PROMIS system, Disposition 
well as residential burglaries) the same 
copied onto a computer tape. From this tape tables were 
in the preceding chapters, 
studied in depth we interviewed prosecutors, 
administrators. Formal courtroom proceedings 
these principal actors were observed, 
doing fieldwork in both San Diego and 
were obtained from questionnaires 
district attorneys' offi.ces and public defenders' 
the members of these offices on their perceptions 
work. Less time (approximately one 
attention was focused on the response of 
Where possible, were tape-recorded and transcribed. In situations 
where tape recorders were too obtrusive, interviews and dialogues were later 
reconstructed from field 
Information on the political history of Proposition 8 was obtained in interviews 
conducted with principal figures in the Proposition 8 campaign and its 
opposition. From those involved in the actual drafting of the law we asked 
specific questions concerning the intent of the law, although, as most 
researchers know, respondents' retrospective interpretations are often 
conveniently fitted present realities. 
The information gleaned from these interviews was combined with newspaper accounts, 
legislative reports and other documents to piece together the context in which thz 
"Victims' Bill of Rights" emerged, 
Data Analysis: Software 
For the interrupted time-series analysis discussed in Chapter Five we used the BMDP 
2T program. Besides being one of the few statistical packages that offers 
interrupted time-series, the program was available on floppy disks for use on 
personal computers. This is a distinct advantage for researchers who need only the 
time series program and want to avoid the expense of the full mainframe package. 
The principal problem we encountered with the program was the fact that the notation 
used in the manual does not always correspond to the notation used in social science 
applications of time-series. This, however, may actually be a consequence of the 
"state of the art" in social science applications, where time-series is a relatively 
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Appendix II: ARIMA Analysis 
The general case of the impact assessment model for a time series may be written as 
Y, N, + f(l,), 
Where Yt the value of the variable being modeled at time t, 
n, the tth value of the noise model, 
and f(l 1 ) the intervention component. 
Of the eight different series modeled for this study, none required seasonal 
differencing, therefore, excluding seasonality, the general case of the noise model, N,, 
may be written as 
N, = (1- B1B- ••• B9 Bq)a, + C 
(1- ¢lB- ••• ~pBP)(l - B)a 
where p the order of the autoregressive process, 
d the degree of non-seasonal differencing, 
q the order of the moving average process, 
~l to ¢p = the regular autoregressive parameter, 
B 1to Bq =the regular moving average parameter 
a 1 = the (random) white noise component, 
C a constant, 
B =the backshift operator: where B(Y,) = Y,_ 1 , 
In an impact assessment analysis, the intervention component, f(I ) , is added to thT 
noise model, therefore, our first task was to estimate a pre-intervention noise model. 
The plots of the autocorrelations (ACF) and the partial autocorrelations (PACF) for each 
pre-intervention series (January 1978 - June 1982) indicated that each was trending or 
drifting and required differencing, After differencing each series, the ACF and PACF 
were plotted and examined, We noted that for each series 1) the ACF and PACF patterns 
suggested that regular differencing was sufficient to impose stationarity, 2) the ACF 
revealed a spike at lag l, and 3) the PACF indicated a decaying pattern. Thus, we 
tentatively identified and estimated an ARIMA (0,1,1) model for all the pre-intervention 
series. Diagnosis confirmed that the residuals for each series was a white noise 
process (a series of
3
random shocks with a mean of zero and a constant variance) and the 
model was accepted. The parameters for each series are displayed in Chapter 5, Table 
1. Below we present the general equation for a differenced MA 1 model 
N, = (1 - B1B)a1 
1 - B 
Having specified and accepted an ARIMA (0,1,1) noise model for each series, we analyzed 
the impact of the intervention using three different intervention components. The 
simplest intervention component, a zero-order transfer function, involves an abrupt-
permanent impact (permanent for the duration of the post-intervention series). This 
model is denoted as 
f (I 1 ) = w0 I, 
where the intervention variable I takes on a value of 0 before the intervention and a 
value of 1 in the post-intervention period. The parameter W0 (omega) indicates the 
"step" or the magnitude that the level of the process increases (or decreases) following 
the intervention. 
A second, more complex model is a first-order transfer function where 
f(I ,) = I, , 
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This model, also a step function, represents a gradual, permanent change in the 
process level. Delta (d), which must be greater than-land less than +1, can be 
seen as the rate of increase or decrease. That is, a process reaches its asymptotic 
change in level in relation to the size of d. If d is large, the increase will be 
slow; if it is small, the asymptotic change in level will be realized rapidly. The 
asymptotic change can he determined by the equation 
The third intervention component hypothesizes an abrupt, but temporary impact in the 
level of the series. In other words, the series undergoes an abrupt change at the 
time of the intervention, but thereafter the contribution the intervention makes 
begins to decay. In this model the intervention component is represented by a pulse 
function where 
(l - B)lt 
and may be written as 
0 prior to and after the intervention, and 
l at the moment of the intervention, 
f(It) 
where the parameter w 0 indicates the magnitude of the impact the first month, W0 d 1 
represents the impact the second month, w0 d1
2 represents the impact the third month, 
and so on. We can also calculate the net impact of an intervention (w0 /1- d 1), or 
measurek-\he impact longevity in the Kth post-intervention observation (percent decay 
~ 1 - d ). In general, if delta is large we assume the decay is very slow and that 
an abrupt, temporary model might not be appropriate. When this occurs, we 
hypothesize a gradual, permanent impact assessment model. If delta is near zero in 
this alternative model, an abrupt impact is suggested and we estimate a final 
intervention-- an abrupt, permanent impact. 
The statewide series for "serious" and "other" felonies was first modeled as an 
abrupt, temporary impact. All parameters (presented below) were significant at .05 
for a two-tailed test w0 for "serious" felonies which was significant at • 05 
for a one-tailed test. However, since d was nearly 1, we concluded that a temporary 














• 81; t 12.19 
.0037; t 3.07 
.99; t 873.22 
Next we estimated a gradual, permanent intervention. The parameter values for this 
model (displayed below) show that d was not significant for "serious" felonies and 
was beyond the bounds of system stability (>1) for "other" felonies. For this 
reason, we decided not to accept the gradual, permanent model either. 
Other Felonies 
-171 .48; t 4. 71 B-1 .56; t 6.04 
wo .0098; t 2.61 Wo .009; t 3.82 
d1 -.83; t -1.62 dl -1.001; t -34.02 
Lastly, we respecified the intervention component as permanent, but abrupt. All 
parameters for this model (reported below) for both "serious" and "other" felonies 
were statistically significant at the .05 level, Further, none of the lags were 
significant and the Ljung-Box Q statistics at lag 20 (8.9 for "serious" felonies and 
16 for "other"
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We are confident, then, in asserting that following the intervention the level of the 
certification rates for "serious" felonies rose .0052, or over half a percent per month 
more than it would have if the pre-intervention trends continued unchanged. Similarly, 
the series level for the certification rates for "other" felonies rose .0045, or 4.5% 
more than it would have if the pre-intervention trends continued. Stated anot.her way, 
we can say that there was a 3.7% (.0052/.139) increase in state certifications for 
"serious" offenses and a 2.5% ( .0045/.181) increase in state certifications for "other" 
offenses relative to the pre-intervention mean. The final impact assessment model for 
the "serious" felonies series may be written as 
Y1 (1 - .48B)a1 + .00521 1 
1 - B 
and final impact assessment model for the "other'' felonies series may be written as 
The Alameda series ultimately required more complex intervention models than the 
statewide series. As with the statewide data, we added an abrupt, temporary impact 
component to the ARIMA (0,1,1) noise model for both the "serious" and "other" felony 
certification rates first. The parameter estimates (given below) were significant for 
both series. However, the forecasts were very poor and did not track either post 
intervention series well. Thus, we decided to reconsider the abrupt, temporary 
intervention component. 
Serious Felonies 
.64; t 7.47 • 61; t 7.34 
Wo • 24; t 3.56 Wo .09 t 2.44 
dl .-71; t -5.20 d! .69 t 4.64 
Upon reexamination of the raw series, we noted that the full impact of the intervention 
did not appear to have been felt until the second month (August 1982). With this in 
mind, we respecified the interven5ion component as an abrupt, temporary impact beginning 
one month after the intervention. All parameter values for both series for this model 
(presented below) were statistical significant, none of the lags were significant, and 
the Q statistics at lag 20 ( 13 and 18 for "serious" and "other" felonies respectively) 
were not significant. Given that the residuals were white noise and the forecasts 




















The interpretation of this impact assessment model is that one month following the 
intervention there was a .13 or 13% jump in certification rates for "serious" felonies 
and a 9. 8% increase for "other" felonies. Following this initial impact, the impact 
added to each month decreased until it reached a certain level ac1d remained there. For 
the "serious" certification rates series, the decay was reached by the 6th month 
following the abrupt increase (95% = 1 - • when it leveled off at approximately 
.56 or a 56% certification rate. For the "other" felonies certification rates series, 




) following the abrupt 
impact when it leveled off at approximately 57% certifications. The final impact 
assessment model for ''serious" felonies certification rates in Alameda may be written as 
y = 
t + .13 (1-B)I,. 
1 - .558 
The final model for the certification rates for "other" felonies in Alameda may be 
written as 
( 1 - .68B)at + 
1 - B 
(1 - B) I 1 . 
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Although we are satisfied with the above models, we report our estimations of a 
gradual, permanent and an abrupt, permanent impact assessment model for comparative 
purposes. The parameters displayed below are for the gradual, permanent impact 
assessment model. Omega was significant only for a one-tailed test at .OS for 
"serious" felonies and was not significant for "other" felonies. Further, delta was 
nearly 1 for both series which is interpreted as meaning that the series were 
trendless prior to the intervention and followed a trend of slope w0 in the post 
intervention period. Yet we were uncomfortable with this interpretation not only 
because it is counter-intuitive, but because as McCleary and Hay state, " • • • such 
a radical change (from a state of e?uilibrium to a state of growth) would rarely be 
observed in the social sciences." Therefore, we chose not to accept the gradual, 
permanent impact assessment model. 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
B-1 .58; t 6.30 B-1 .46; t = 4.55 
Wo .022; t 1.90 Wo .023; t = 1.68 
d1 -.98; t -5.31 dl -.995; t =-13.95 
Lastly, we modeled an abrupt, permanent change and found that the intervention 














The impact assessments for the San Diego series for "serious" and "other" felony 
certification rates were also modeled using an ARIMA (0,1,1) model and each of the 
three intervention components. The parameter values and t-statistics for each are 
given below. 








































.76; t 10.72 
.072; t 1.29* 
-.093; t -.11 * 
Other Felonies 
.74; t 10.37 
.007; t 1. 12* 
-.998; t -1.86* 
Other Felonies 
• 74; t 10.24 
.003; t .91* 
Given that all intervention parameters in these models were insi!',nificant, we modeled 
the full series for both "serious" and "other" felony certification rates as a 
regularly differenced, first order moving average series. The parameter for these 
models is presented below. 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
• 71; t = 9.30 B-1 ; .72; t = 9.96 
The Q-20 statistics of 20 for "serious" 
significant and the residuals were white noise. 
certication rates may be written as: 
and 17 for "other" felonies were not 
Thus, the model for "serious" felony 
Yt (1- .71B)a, 
1 - B 
The model for "other" felony certification rates may be written as: 
Yt = (1- .72B)a, 
1 - B 
Unlike the impact assessment models, however, 
8
a noise model alone is, as McCleary and 
Hay state, "atheoretical and uninterpretable." Therefore, the only interpretation we 
can make from this model is that the intervention -- passage of Proposition 8 -- did not 
affect the certification rates for "serious" or "other" felonies in San Diego. 
Finally, we analyzed the pr-oportion of superior court convictions for "serious" and 
''other" felony cases that r-esulted in prison sentences. None of the three intervention 
models that wer-e added to the ARIMA (0,1,1) model were significant, as can be seen from 
the parameter values and t-statistics listed below. 
Abrupt, temporary impact assessment: 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
B-1 .52; t 5.43 B-1 .35; t 3.36 
wo .016; t .99* Wo .011; t .78* 
dl -.15; t -.14* d1 .13; t .11* 
Gradual, permanent impact assessment: 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
B-1 • 53; t 5.55 -6j • 34; t 3.27 
wo .005; t 1.69* Wo .001; t .26* 
d1 -1.03; t -160.04 d1 -. 61; t -.12* 
Abrupt, permanent impact assessment: 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
~ .54; t 5.80 -e-1 .34; t 3.37 
Wo .002 t 1.31* wo .0005; t • 32* 
(* = not significant at the .05 level) 
Again, since we found no significant intervention, we estimated an ARIMA (0,1,1) model 
for the full series for "serious" and "other" felony prison sentences. The residuals 
for both series were not different from white noise, the Q-20 statistics were not 
significant ( 9. 9 for "serious" and 19 for "other" felonies), and, as can be seen below, 
the parameters were statistically significant. 
Serious Felonies Other Felonies 
~ = .52; t = 5.51 -e-1 = • 34; t = 3.37 
The model for the prison sentences for "serious" felonies is: 
Y, (1 - .52B)a, 
1 - B 
The model for the prison sentences for "other" felonies is: 
Y1 (1 - .34B)a,. 





We are deviating from McCleary and !lay by estimating the noise model from the 
pre-intervention series rather than the full series (even though the intervention is 
not dramatic in any of the series). See Richard McCleary and Richard A. Hay, Jr., 
Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1980). Our objective was to prevent the intervention from complicating 
the noise model to any degree, although practically speaking, all the noise models in 
this study were essentially the same whether the pre-intervention or the full series 
was modeled. 
2 
There were some exceptions to this general statement. The residuals for the 
MA 1 model for certification rates for "other" felonies showed a significant lag 1 in 
both the ACF and PACF. An MA 2 model for the pre-intervention series proved to be 
significant and the residuals were white noise. However, the second moving average 
parameter was rendered insignificant when the various intervention components were 
added to the noise model, therefore, the second moving average parameter was dropped 
for this series. Also, lag 5 in the residuals of an MA I model for the pre-
intervention "prison sentences for serious felonies" series was significant. 
However, in the final ARIMA ( 0,1, l) model for the full series, it became 
insignificant. 
3 
The mean of the differenced series was insignificant in every series, so it 
was not necessary to include a constant term in any of the ARIMA (0,1,1) noise 
models. Nonetheless, as a check on this assumption, we estimated ARIMA (0,1,1) with 
a constant or trend parameter for each series. With the exception of both the 
"serious" and "other" felony series for the state, each trend parameter was 
insignificant or only marginally significant. Further, although both state series 
seemed to call for a constant, we noted that its inclusion caused the moving average 
parameter to approach the bounds of invertibility (> l) and so we eliminated it from 
both state series. 
4 
The parameter estimates are all taken from the BMDP 2T backcasting option. 
5 
The Ljung-Box Q statistics is a test based on the residual autocorrelations as 
a set. It follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of lags minus the number of parameters estimated in the model. At lag 20 (Q-
20) the chi-square critical values at the .05 level are: 
6 










The gradual, permanent abrupt, permanent intervention components were also 
estimated as higher order models, but not significant. 
7 
McCleary and Hay, 1980, 
P• 159 
8 
McCleary and Hay, 1980, 
p. 159 
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